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Abstract:
In the landmark case of United States v. Jones, as many as five Supreme Court justices indicated
that tracking the geolocation of a car for a month would be a Fourth Amendment search even though
tracking the same car for a day would not be. This duration distinction is based on an influential theory
of the Fourth Amendment, dubbed the mosaic theory, which posits that the aggregation of several nonsearches of the same person might amount to a search. Jurists have justified the mosaic theory’s
duration-sensitivity by grounding it in their sense of “popular attitudes” regarding privacy expectations.
Through an empirical examination of survey responses from three large nationally representative
samples totaling over 2800 US citizens, we show that Americans’ actual privacy expectations run directly
counter to the mosaic theory. Where the mosaic theory says that tracking duration affects citizens’
expectations of privacy, ordinary Americans overwhelmingly say it does not. Our data also reveal that
younger Americans and those Americans holding the most firmly anti-authoritarian views have
significantly greater expectations of privacy in geolocation information than their fellow citizens.
Americans do say that longer duration surveillance is more intrusive than shorter duration surveillance,
but the magnitude of this effect remains small.
We explore the implications of these findings for the mosaic theory by considering the role of
public opinion data in Fourth Amendment doctrine more generally. We ultimately propose a clarified
approach to the classic Katz v. United States “reasonable expectations of privacy” framework that
formalizes the role of public opinion by reframing the first prong of Katz to ask whether people in
general expect privacy in a given context, and the question of what “society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable” in Katz as one for which the perceived intrusiveness of a search is germane. To show how
survey data could shed light on current Fourth Amendment controversies, we also provide
contemporary data about American citizens’ privacy expectations when faced with various scenarios.
The paper presents new data on popular expectations of privacy with regard to police use of stingray
devices, cell tower geolocation, email content analysis, hotel guest registry searches, and various sorts
of surveillance cameras.
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The mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment holds that, when it comes to people’s reasonable
expectations of privacy, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 1 More precisely, it suggests that
the government can learn more from a given slice of information if it can put that information in the
context of a broader pattern, a mosaic. This insight, that the incremental privacy threat posed by the
government’s acquisition of information increases as more information is obtained, was given its most
forceful articulation by Judge Ginsburg of the DC Circuit in the landmark case that ultimately became
United States v. Jones.
Writing for the appellate court panel, Judge Ginsburg used a mosaic theory to explain why
long-term geolocation surveillance of a vehicle was categorically different from short-term surveillance:
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he
does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about a person than
does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or
a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these
places over the course of a month. The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal
still more; a single trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but that trip
followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. 2
This analysis allowed the DC Circuit to reach an otherwise difficult conclusion. A controlling precedent,
United States v. Knotts, had held that an individual driving a car on public roads has no expectation of
privacy in her whereabouts. 3 Ginsburg wished to argue that long-term monitoring of an individual is
different, that a lack of constitutional protection against being seen in public at any given moment in
time does not preclude the possibility that the police would need to obtain a warrant to record
someone’s movements for several weeks. This approach stood in stark contrast to most prior Fourth
Amendment thinking. 4
Very soon thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed to hear the Jones case.
The majority decided in favor of the defendant on narrow grounds, holding that the installation of the
device was a trespass and therefore a search. 5 To the surprise of many, however, four justices signed a
concurrence that evidently doubled-down on Judge Ginsburg’s mosaic theory. 6 Justice Alito, writing for
1

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he whole of one’s movements is not exposed
constructively even though each individual movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more – sometimes a
great deal more – than the sum of its parts.”).
2

Id. at 562.

460 U.S. 276 (1983). For an early and incisive critique of Knotts, see Richard H. McAdams, Note, Tying Privacy in
Knotts: Beeper Privacy and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297 (1985).

3

See David Gray et al., Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 760
(2013).

4

5

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).

See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 334 (5th ed. 2015) (“Both concurring
opinions, involving five justices, embraced a new theory of privacy. In previous cases, the Court has focused
extensively on whether something . . . was exposed to the public. The concurrences recognize that extensive and
aggregated surveillance can violate a reasonable expectation of privacy regardless of whether or not such
surveillance occurred in public.”); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,
314 (2012) (“The concurring opinions in Jones raise the intriguing possibility that a five-justice majority of the
6

3

Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan wrote that warrantless geolocation surveillance for four weeks
was unconstitutional, even though surveillance for a short period of time would not be. As he stated:
Under this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on
public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as
reasonable. But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses, society’s expectation
has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main,
simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an
individual’s car for a very long period. In this case, for four weeks, law enforcement
agents tracked every movement that respondent made in the vehicle he was driving.
We need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle
became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4–week mark. 7
As we will demonstrate below, Justice Alito mostly grounds his short-term versus long-term distinction
in the purported actual beliefs of reasonable people, referring in various places to “popular attitudes,”
“popular expectations,” and “the average person’s expectations.” 8 In her separate concurrence, Justice
Sotomayor expressed evident approval for mosaic theory-style reasoning, focusing on the conclusions
that could be drawn from prolonged surveillance. 9 She agreed with Justice Alito that “longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses” would amount to a search, though she did not take an
explicit position on whether a search warrant would also be required for short-term geolocation
monitoring. 10 Given Alito and Sotomayor’s opinions, it seems that there will be five votes for the
mosaic theory and its “duration sensitive” approach in whatever case comes next. 11
Indeed, post-Jones cases indicate that nearly all the justices are beginning to talk about privacy
in mosaic theory terms. Riley v. California made this particularly clear. 12 The Chief Justice, writing on
Supreme Court is ready to endorse a new mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment protection.”); but cf. infra note 29
(identifying another possible explanation for the duration distinction).
7

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted).

8

See infra section II.A.

Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441–442 (2009) (‘Disclosed in [GPS] data ... will be trips
the indisputably private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-thehour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on’”)); Ryan Birss, Note,
Alito’s Way: Application of Justice Alito’s Opinion in United States v. Jones to Cell Phone Location Data, 65 HASTINGS
L. J. 899, 925 (2014).
9

Id. (“I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’ In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique
attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention.”).

10

See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric
Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 507 (2012); Gray et al., supra note 4, at 764; Kerr, supra note 6,
at 313; Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1963 (2014).
11

12

134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).

4

behalf of eight justices, held that the police generally could not search an arrestee’s cell phone at the
time of the arrest without obtaining a warrant. Explaining why the arrestee’s wallet could be searched
but his cell phone could not, the Court offered an argument that is much akin to the mosaic theory:
[A] cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information – an address, a
note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video – that reveal much more in combination
than any isolated record. . . . The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the
same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. [Finally],
the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier. A
person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he
would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several
months, as would routinely be kept on a phone. 13
It is this aggregation of multifaceted information over a long time period – which Roberts viewed as
qualitatively distinct from the mere snapshot exposed by prior searches – that so worried the Chief
Justice. Because of this emphasis on quantity and time-scale, Riley hints that mosaic-theory reasoning
about the Fourth Amendment may have rapidly won over nearly all the justices.
If fully embraced by the Court, the mosaic theory would upend decades of settled doctrine. 14 It
is therefore hardly surprising that legal scholars have begun to explore a number of important
questions posed by the sudden rise of the mosaic theory. 15 But at least one fundamental question
remains unaddressed by the courts and in the literature so far: Does the mosaic theory, which is
explicitly grounded in people’s reasonable expectations of privacy, actually resonate with the public’s
expectations? When presented with the kinds of scenarios that the Court was wrestling with in Jones –
momentary geolocation surveillance, day-long surveillance, month-long surveillance, etc. – do ordinary
Americans agree with Justice Alito that duration determines expectations of privacy?
The answer is that the public does not agree with him. Specifically, only a very small proportion
of the respondents in our representative (census-weighted) national sample said that the duration of
the surveillance affected whether they would expect privacy in their geolocation information.
According to our survey data, a large majority of the Americans always expect privacy in their
geolocation information, a meaningful minority never expect privacy, and only a tiny remnant allow
their expectations to depend on surveillance duration. Put another way: If we ask people whether they
expect the police to be able to obtain geolocation information tracking someone’s whereabouts over
the course of a day or a month, the clear plurality say no to both, a sizable minority say yes to both, and
a very small number of respondents provide the answer that is consistent with the mosaic theory and
13

Id. at 2489 (emphasis added).

See Monu Bedi, Social Networks, Government Surveillance, and the Fourth Amendment Mosaic Theory, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 1809, 1840-44 (2014); David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the
Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1072-73 (2014).
14

See, e.g., Bedi, supra note 14, at 1809; Jace C. Gatewood, District of Columbia Jones and the Mosaic Theory – In
Search of a Public Right of Privacy: The Equilibrium Effect of the Mosaic Theory, 92 NEB. L. REV. 504 (2014); David
Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013); Gray et al., supra note 4, at
745; Kerr, supra note 6, at 311; Benjamin M. Ostrander, Note, The “Mosaic Theory” and Fourth Amendment Law,
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1733 (2011); Andrew B. Talai, Comment, Drones and Jones: The Fourth Amendment and
Police Discretion in the Digital Age, 102 CAL. L. REV. 729 (2014).
15
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Justice Alito’s gloss on it – yes for one day and no for one month. The percentage of respondents who
believed that surveillance either definitely or likely violated a reasonable expectation of privacy rose by
just three percentage points when the surveillance’s duration was described as month-long rather than
day-long.
That duration was of such limited relevance took both of us by surprise. We believe it would
take at least four Supreme Court justices by surprise as well. Before we launched our first survey, we
had expected that respondents would agree with Justice Alito that the duration of the surveillance was
central to the question of whether police surveillance violated a reasonable expectation of privacy.
After learning otherwise in wave one of our survey, we supplemented wave two so that respondents
who believed that surveillance duration did not matter would be asked follow-up questions to explain
their reasoning. Our results here were also surprising. The respondents who consistently felt that
surveillance for a day, a week, or a month did not violate their reasonable expectations of privacy
overwhelmingly embraced the third-party-doctrine as the basis for their views. 16 Notwithstanding the
criticism to which this doctrine has been subjected in recent years, 17 about 15% of our sample
embraced it and its privacy-skeptical implications. Respondents who felt that both one-day and onemonth surveillance did violate their reasonable expectations of privacy were far more numerous but
slightly less unified in their rationales. The most commonly expressed bases for that view were (1) that
the police were likely to abuse any power to obtain the geolocation of an individual’s car; 18 and (2) that
giving the police such power threatened personal freedom. Both responses commanded majority
support among duration-insensitive respondents who felt the surveillance infringed on reasonable
expectations of privacy. 19
A third wave conducted almost a year later replicated the prior findings, showing an impressive
level of stability in privacy expectations over time. This third collection also included separate questions
on the perceived intrusiveness of searches. Though the doctrine emphasizes expectations in
determining whether a law enforcement action implicates the Fourth Amendment, the perceived
intrusiveness of a proposed search is relevant to the question of whether a particular privacy

16

The third party doctrine holds that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy that information
voluntarily shared with third parties (like the bank, a telecommunications company, or passers by) will not be
exposed to the government’s agents. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of Reasonable
Expectations, 24 BERKELEY L. & TECH. L.J. 1199 (2009); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth
Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 976-77
(2007); Erin E. Murphy, The Case Against the Case for the Third Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2009); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1089-1117 (2002); Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 581 (2011); infra text accompanying note 164. But see Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107
MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009) (defending the doctrine).
17

18

Notably these surveys were conducted in June and July 2014, prior to the prominent controversies surrounding
Michael Brown and Eric Garner capturing public attention.
19

Respondents were asked to select the one or two rationales that best explained their views. Among those with
consistently low privacy expectations, 48.9 percent selected one option, 37.8 percent selected two, and the
remainder selected three or more. Among those with consistently high expectations, 37.8 percent selected one
option, 39.2 percent selected two options, and the remainder selected two or more.

6

expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 20 More participants drew
duration-distinctions in the domain of intrusiveness but, again, consistency was the rule.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides some essential background on Fourth
Amendment search and seizure law and then examines the post-Jones case law to see how the
question of surveillance duration has played out. The lower courts have embraced three divergent
approaches to the question of how to treat the suggestion in Justice Alito’s concurrence that
warrantless surveillance becomes unconstitutional as its duration increases. Some courts have treated
Alito’s concurrence as something akin to binding precedent, deciding in a Goldilocks fashion whether a
particular length of surveillance crossed the constitutional line. Others have ignored or even disparaged
Justice Alito’s framework, continuing to hold that the duration of geolocation surveillance is irrelevant
to the constitutional analysis. Finally, a couple of state supreme courts have deviated from the Alito
analysis by holding that geolocation surveillance of any duration amounts to a search under state
constitutional law.
Part II offers several arguments about why drawing on reliable social science research
regarding public sentiment lends itself to relatively predictable and workable rules of thumb for law
enforcement and the citizenry to follow. We also parse the case law to suggest a framework that is
more coherent than the ones proposed in the existing doctrinal literature. Under our proposed
approach, inquiries concerning the scope of the Fourth Amendment would have a tripartite framework.
First, courts would decide whether law enforcement actions violate a suspect’s property rights. If so,
the police conduct would amount to a search. This is consistent with the majority opinion in Jones,
which focused on whether law enforcement had trespassed on the suspect’s property by installing a
small tracking device on his car. Second, if there was no police trespass, then the courts would apply a
clarified version of the framework from Katz v. United States. Katz prong 1 would prompt courts to
scrutinize survey research to determine whether people in general expect privacy against a particular
law enforcement strategy. Katz prong 2 would focus on the sensitivity of the information collected by
the police, again using survey research results about whether information revealed by particular
searches would be sensitive or embarrassing. Part II also provides a truncated normative defense of
this approach.
Part III presents our empirical data, derived from census-representative surveys. Our main
finding is that the duration of surveillance barely affects the extent to which the public regards
geolocation tracking as invading their reasonable expectations of privacy. Whatever the policy merits of
the mosaic theory, it does not resonate intuitively with ordinary Americans. Several of our secondary
findings are also important. First, follow-up questions directed at the duration-insensitive participants
showed that concerns about freedom and police abuse largely drive the views of those whose
expectations are violated by warrantless surveillance of any duration and the third party doctrine
uniquely explains the views of those who regard warrantless long- and short-term geolocation
surveillance as consistent with their expectations. Second, our data indicate that younger Americans
actually have stronger expectations of privacy in their geolocation data than older Americans, and that
anti-authoritarian attitudes are strongly correlated with privacy expectations. Finally, our data give a
clear answer to the question of whether Americans expect that the police will be able to monitor the
location of citizens’ vehicles remotely, without first obtaining a warrant. Most Americans who take a
position regard such warrantless surveillance as a violation of their reasonable expectations of privacy.
The rejection of the mosaic theory’s duration sensitivity is therefore principally driven by those who
20

See infra text accompanying notes 125-126.
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have more robust privacy expectations than are accounted for in existing doctrine. Part III concludes by
offering new data on popular expectations regarding a number of presently controversial policing
strategies, such as the use of stingray devices to determine citizens’ geolocation or the examination of
hotel guest registries. By presenting a census-representative sample of the population with various
neutral scenarios, it is easy to spot those instances in which police tactics are fully consistent with or
largely contrary to prevalent expectations of privacy.

I.

Surveillance Duration After Jones

Two cases decided forty-five years apart stand as the most important landmarks of modern
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held that wiretaps are a
search under the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United States. 21 And nearly half a century later in 2012,
the Court held in United States v. Jones that month-long geolocation surveillance, effectuated by the
installation of a GPS device on a vehicle, similarly amounted to a search. 22 Interestingly, in neither case
is the Court’s majority opinion the central focus of scholarly inquiry. Rather, it is the primary
concurrences – Justice Harlan’s in Katz and Justice Alito’s in Jones – that tantalize jurists and fascinate
scholars.
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz set out the reasonable expectations test for Fourth Amendment
protections. He wrote that police conduct amounts to a search, thereby implicating the Fourth
Amendment, when “a person [exhibits] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and [when] the
expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” In subsequent years, this
test was embraced by numerous Supreme Court majorities and has become the key touchstone for
determining whether a warrant is generally required before law enforcement can employ a particular
surveillance strategy. 23 The framework has taken on importance beyond constitutional law as well.
Hence, the Katz test also determines whether a defendant’s conduct is covered by federal wiretap
statutes. 24 For nearly 50 years, therefore, courts have spoken of “reasonable expectations of privacy.”
Some courts and commentators have treated Justice Alito’s opinion in Jones as a similarly
important shift in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. His focus on surveillance duration makes the
combination of two discrete acts that are independently not searches – say, surveillance for one week
and surveillance for the next week – a Fourth Amendment search. One federal court recently dubbed
Alito’s opinion “the shadow majority opinion in United States v. Jones,” 25 and academic commentators

389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 13 (2007) (“Katz v. United States [is] the most important judicial decision on the scope of the
Fourth Amendment.”).
21

22

132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).

Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 382 (1974) (describing
Katz as a “watershed in fourth amendment jurisprudence”). For an illuminating examination of Katz’s backstory,
see Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009).
23

See, e.g., Huff v. Spaw, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 4430466 at *3-*4 (6th Cir. July 21, 2015); United States v. Turner,
209 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000).

24

25

In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Historical
Cell Site Information for Telephone Number [Redacted], 40 F.Supp.3d 89, 92 (D.D.C. 2014).
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have referred to it likewise as “Jones’s second majority opinion,” 26 using Sotomayor’s adoption of
portions of Alito’s reasoning as a justification for adding her vote to Alito’s four. Foreseeing the
potential importance of Alito’s doctrinal shift, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion made a point of
specifically criticizing the salience of surveillance duration in Justice Alito’s four justice concurrence.
Scalia wrote:
The concurrence posits that “relatively short-term monitoring of a person's movements
on public streets” is okay, but that “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses” is no good. (emphasis added). That introduces yet
another novelty into our jurisprudence. There is no precedent for the proposition that
whether a search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being investigated.
And even accepting that novelty, it remains unexplained why a 4–week investigation is
“surely” too long and why a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving substantial amounts of
cash and narcotics is not an “extraordinary offense” which may permit longer
observation. What of a 2–day monitoring of a suspected purveyor of stolen electronics?
Or of a 6–month monitoring of a suspected terrorist? We may have to grapple with
these “vexing problems” in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not
involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing
forward to resolve them here. 27
After Jones, the “vexing problems” raised by Alito’s concurrence have become arguably the most
important looming questions in Fourth Amendment law. 28 If Justice Alito’s apparent 29 nod in the
Jonathan Siegel & Kate Hadley, Jones’s Second Majority Opinion: Justice Alito’s Concurrence and the New Katz
Test, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 1, 2 (2012) (“While the concurrence only gained four votes in Jones, Justice
Sotomayor explicitly endorsed Justice Alito’s approach in her own concurrence, providing the necessary fifth vote
for a future majority opinion.”).

26

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (majority opinion). It is perhaps puzzling that Justice Sotomayor signed on to an opinion
that contained this language. Yet her separate concurrence indicates that she was joining Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in full. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). A charitable reading of her view is that she is inclined to
believe that warrantless geolocation surveillance of any duration is constitutionally problematic, so she agrees
with Justice Scalia’s criticism of the Alito framework as underprotective rather than overprotective. Or she may
agree with Justice Scalia that it was premature to decide that issue in Jones. A less charitable reading is that Justice
Sotomayor made a mistake and should have only concurred in the result in Jones, as Justice Alito did. Some courts
have read Sotomayor’s opinion as agreeing with Justice Alito about Katz, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4
N.E.3d 846, 860 n.32 (Mass. 2014) (“Justice Sotomayor, in a separate concurring opinion joined in Justice Alito’s
view about privacy.”), which would seem to support the mistake interpretation.
27

See generally Caleb Mason, New Police Surveillance Technologies and the Good-Faith Exception: Warrantless GPS
Tracker Evidence after United States v. Jones, 13 NEV. L.J. 60, 61 (2012).
28

29

We say “apparent” here because it is conceivable that Justice Alito and the justices who signed his concurrence
were implicitly adopting another rationale for their duration-sensitive shadow holding. Perhaps they believe that
because law enforcement have long been able to tail suspects for a day using unmarked police cars, people expect
such conduct, whereas tailing suspects for a month was impractical and therefore unexpected. If that was indeed
Justice Alito’s rationale, our survey data shows that the rationale turns out not to be a good prediction of what the
public actually expects. See infra tbls. 1-3. Note also Table 5, which indicates that our respondents rarely think
about expectations of privacy in ways tied to the state’s expenditures on surveillance. In any event, our survey
tests the congruence between expectations and the shadow holding in Justice Alito’s opinion rather than testing
sentiment regarding any particular rationale for that holding.

9

direction of the mosaic theory indeed represents the future of Katz, then many settled assumptions
about Fourth Amendment search doctrines may be called into question.
Though the Supreme Court has not yet revisited the issue of surveillance duration in the few
years since Jones, the issue has already arisen in a number of lower court cases. Some courts have
treated Alito’s concurrence in Jones as akin to binding precedent. In United States v. Skinner, 30 decided
about half a year after Jones, the Sixth Circuit considered whether tracking a criminal suspect for three
days by pinging his phone to determine the closest cell phone towers amounted to a Fourth
Amendment search. 31 The cell tower information led them to the suspect’s mobile home, where they
discovered large quantities of marijuana and two semi-automatic weapons. The Sixth Circuit used at its
starting point Justice Alito’s opinion, and viewed the difference between 28-day-tracking and 3-day
tracking as constitutionally dispositive:
Justice Alito’s concurrence and the majority in Jones both recognized that there
is little precedent for what constitutes a level of comprehensive tracking that
would violate the Fourth Amendment. Skinner’s case, however, comes nowhere
near that line. While Jones involved intensive monitoring over a 28-day period,
here the DEA agents only tracked Skinner’s cell phone for three days. Such
“relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets
accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as
reasonable.” Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 32
A subsequent case in Michigan applied Skinner and deemed real-time surveillance of several cell
phones that lasted between 30 and 45 days to be a search, requiring a warrant supported by probable
cause. 33 The boundary between permissible and impermissible warrantless real-time surveillance of
geolocation in the Sixth Circuit is therefore somewhere between three and twenty-nine days. 34 Another
subsequent decision, also from a district court in Michigan, went even further than the Court in Jones
and held that a warrant allowing for cellphone GPS tracking for a 30 day period was invalid for lack of
particularity. 35 According to that court, such prolonged surveillance was so troublesome that, absent
minimization procedures, “[t]he tracking warrants were akin to the general warrants condemned by
the Founders and are repugnant to the Fourth Amendment.” 36

30

690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).

31

Id. at 776.

32

Id. at 780 (internal citations omitted).

United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp.2d 759, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2013). Although the Powell court found that
warrants backed by probable cause were required, id. at 778, 780, it nevertheless deemed the geolocation
admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 783-84.
33

34
See also Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 865 (Mass. 2014) (applying the Alito Jones framework to
historical cell site tracking information and deeming the collection of two weeks’ worth of geolocation information
without a warrant to violate the state constitution).
35

See United States v. White, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166444 (E.D. Mich. November 24, 2014).

36

Id. Again, however, the suppression motion was denied under the good-faith exception. See supra note 33.
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Other lower courts have differed sharply. The court in United States v. Graham, 37 decided
during the same year as Skinner and Jones, deemed itself not to be bound by the Alito and Sotomayor’s
concurrences. The Graham court read the precedents in this way:
While this Court is cognizant of Justice Alito’s statement in Jones that “the use of longer
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy,” the law as it now stands simply does not contemplate a situation whereby
traditional surveillance becomes a Fourth Amendment “search” only after some
specified period of time – discrete acts of law enforcement are either constitutional or
they are not. . . . Further, it is entirely unclear what the implications would be of an
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that protects “cumulative data” collected by
law enforcement. Taken to its logical extreme, such a reading would theoretically affect
entire police investigations, and not just surveillance via cell site location data. . . . If that
is how the Fourth Amendment is to be interpreted, then the police could commit a
constitutional violation by taking enough individually permissible steps, that in the
aggregate, add up to a substantial amount of data being collected on suspect – thereby
infringing his reasonable expectation of privacy. 38
The Graham court can count to five just as well as anyone else, 39 but it refused to believe that Justices
Alito, Sotomayor, and their three colleagues actually meant the sort of radical doctrinal shift that their
opinions indicated. Accordingly, it held that the government’s acquisition of two hundred and thirtyfive days’ worth of historic cell site information without a warrant did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 40 A recent en banc opinion in the Eleventh Circuit revealed a court deeply fractured over
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment after Jones, with the majority arguing that the Alito and
Sotomayor concurrences changed nothing, the dissenter arguing that the game has permanently
changed, and three different concurrences trying to make sense of it all. 41 Indeed, even the district
court considering Jones itself on remand opined that Justice Alito’s proposed distinction between
short-term surveillance and long-term surveillance was not the law, though it wound up dodging the
question of whether the four-month cell tower tracking information gathered by the police in that
investigation was collected unconstitutionally. 42

37

846 F. Supp.2d 384 (D. Md. 2012). The case is presently pending on appeal before the Fourth Circuit.

38

Id. at 401-02.

Id. at 404 n. 15 (“In light of Justice Sotomayor’s apparent endorsement of Justice Alito’s concurrence, Jones can
be plausibly understood as having two separate majority opinions. In that case, it appears as though a five-to-four
majority of the Court might, in the future, endorse and craft some version of a mosaic Fourth Amendment
doctrine.”).

39

Id. at 387 (235 days is the cumulative total from two periods of surveillance.) In Graham the government never
sought a warrant for the surveillance but it did apply to magistrate judges for orders authorizing the surveillance,
pursuant to the Stored Communications Act. Id. at 386-87. At issue in Graham was whether the Act’s provisions fell
below the constitutional floor set by Jones.
40

41

United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc).

42

United States v. Jones, 908 F. Supp.2d 203, 213-14 (D.D.C. 2012). The district court held the evidence admissible
under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 214-16.
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The Florida Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Tracey v. State, 43 provides yet another approach
to construing Jones. Tracey reviewed the various concurring opinions in Jones and concluded that the
duration of monitoring could not be constitutionally decisive, citing Graham for this proposition. 44
Distinguishing away the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Knotts, the court found that tracking
Tracey’s cell phones in real time on public roads for one day without a warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment. 45 Surveillance duration was therefore irrelevant because the police action was always a
search. Other courts have held that warrantless cell-phone tracking for just one evening is generally
unconstitutional under their state constitutions. 46
With these three disparate approaches, we have seen the federal and state courts fragment
every which way on the duration question foregrounded by Justice Alito’s opinion in Jones. Some
judges, like those in Skinner, follow the Alito framework and use it to deem warrantless short-term
geolocation surveillance constitutionally permissible and warrantless long-term surveillance
impermissible. 47 Other courts, like Graham, ignore the duration of geolocation surveillance because
they regard the Alito framework as unworkable, holding both long and short-term surveillance
permissible. 48 Finally, other courts may soon follow Tracey in rejecting the salience of surveillance
duration by holding even very short-term warrantless geolocation tracking impermissible. 49 As it
presently stands, one-day warrantless surveillance is unconstitutional in Florida and New Jersey but
235-day warrantless surveillance is constitutionally permitted in Maryland. That situation cannot
represent a stable equilibrium. The Supreme Court will need to revisit the salience of duration in the
constitutional analysis soon. In the Part that follows, we will argue that the Supreme Court should
consider public opinion data when it does so.

II.

The Katz Framework’s Ambiguity

Under Katz, whether police conduct constitutes a “search” and invokes Fourth Amendment
protections depends on whether it violates reasonable expectations of privacy. The most obvious way to
43

152 So.3d 504 (Fla. Oct. 16, 2014).

Id. at 520 (“[B]asing the determination as to whether warrantless real time cell site location tracking violates the
Fourth Amendment on the length of the time the cell phone is monitored is not a workable analysis. It requires
case-by-case, after-the-fact, ad hoc determinations whether the length of the monitoring crossed the threshold of
the Fourth Amendment in each case challenged.”).
44

45

Id. at 525-26.

See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013) (“[W]e hold today that police must obtain a warrant based
on a showing of probable cause, or qualify for an exception to the warrant requirement, to obtain tracking
information through the use of a cell phone. . . . Our ruling today is based solely on the State Constitution. We
recognize that Jones and Smith, to the extent they apply, would not require a warrant in this case.”).

46

47

See supra text accompanying notes 30-36.

48

United States v. Wilford, 961 F. Supp. 2d 740 (D. Md. 2013) (“But the mosaic theory was not adopted as a
holding by the Supreme Court, nor has it been endorsed by the Fourth Circuit. And, it appears somewhat
unworkable in practice.”); see also United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1029 (D. Minn.
2012) (ignoring the duration of surveillance under Katz and Jones in deeming the police’s use of GPS tracking on a
vehicle constitutionally permissible); State v. Drayton, 411 S.C. 533 (S.C. App. 2015) (following Graham, not
Tracey).
49

See Earls, 70 A.3d at 630.
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determine the privacy expectations of ordinary people is to ask lots of people what level of privacy they
expect in a given scenario and tally those responses. Indeed, one might suppose this straightforward
approach to resolving questions of what constitutes a search seems is so plainly consistent with the text
of the Katz test that use of a survey methodology would be uncontroversial. As it happens, however,
there are fierce disputes among both jurists and scholars as to whether it is appropriate to consult
survey data in determining the content of people’s reasonable expectations of privacy. The debate is
presently unresolved and it continues to preoccupy at least some justices on the Court. In this Part we
will highlight some prominent recent judicial statements about Fourth Amendment methodologies, and
Justice Alito will again be cast as lead actor. We will then bring into the mix work by Orin Kerr, which
shows that courts often resolve Katz questions without recourse to reliable data about what ordinary
Americans believe and expect in particular contexts. Kerr both describes and defends courts’ current
practices. We will then present a normative case for integrating survey research into Katz doctrine,
building on important work previously done by Christopher Slobogin. Along the way we offer both
strong and weak versions of the argument. The strong version suggests that survey research should be
dispositive on some doctrinal questions concerning reasonable expectations of privacy. The alternative
weak and incrementalist version suggests that survey research should be merely informative. Under our
strong case approach, the systematic use of survey research data presents a way to resolve a present
doctrinal conundrum that has arisen in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

A. Are Actual Beliefs Actually Relevant?

Justice Alito is the member of the Court who seems most interested in exploring the relevance
of what members of the public actually believe about searches. A recent oral argument exchange
highlights his frustration with the present uncertainty over Fourth Amendment methodologies. In
October Term 2013, the Supreme Court held that, absent exigent circumstances, it will usually be
unreasonable for law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search of a suspect’s cell phone incident to
his arrest. 50 During the oral argument for what would become the Court’s landmark opinion in Riley v.
California, the following exchange occurred between Justice Alito and Judith Mizner, an Assistant
Federal Public Defender:
JUSTICE ALITO: In determining whether the examination of information on a cell phone …
constitutes a search, what do you think … we are doing? Are … we answering an empirical
question, what is the reasonable expectation of privacy of a -- of a person in 2014 who has a cell
phone … on his or her person? Or are we legislating what we think is a good privacy rule?
MS. MIZNER: I think the Court is determining whether or not in 2014 an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy against government intrusion into a device that carries around
an increasingly large percentage of somebody’s personal and private information.
JUSTICE ALITO: All right. Well, a lot of that -- part of that is the person must act -- people must
actually have that expectation. That must be the expectation of people at large in 2014, that they
think that everything that’s on their cell phones is private, or they think some of the information
on the cell phones is private, or they think nothing on the cell phone is private. Where do you
think we should look to answer that question about what people in 2014 think about that
question?
MS. MIZNER: I think from the fact that people carry them with them in -- in a pocket or in a
purse, that that exhibits an expectation of privacy. You don’t expect people to be rummaging
through your pockets or -- or through the items you're carrying.
50

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
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JUSTICE ALITO: But why is that so? Cell phones are different. I’m not going to … suggest for a
second that there are like things that existed in the pre-digital area. But in the pre-digital era,
presumably people didn’t have a reasonable expectation of privacy in papers, letters, things like
that that they had, of photos in a billfold, numbers, addresses, things that they might -- they
might be carrying on their persons. … So how do we determine what the -- what the new
expectation of privacy is now?
MS. MIZNER: I think people did have an expectation of privacy in those items until -JUSTICE ALITO: Then why was it not a search when … you searched the pocket of somebody who
was arrested and you found the address of someplace?
MS. MIZNER: I believe it is a search, Justice Alito. It’s a question of whether it is a search that has
been justified by an exception to the warrant requirement … or the permissible scope of the
search incident to arrest. It’s still a search.
JUSTICE ALITO: All right. [H]ow do we determine whether … somebody has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in any category of information that is contained on a cell phone?
MS. MIZNER: Because of the interconnectivity of the data, I don’t think you can say a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in this app, but not that app, because you don’t know what is
linked to any other part of the cell phone. So the rule that provides the security that the Fourth
Amendment is intended to give an individual would be to say – [Justice Sotomayor interrupts and
changes the subject.] 51

By our count, Justice Alito asked Mizner the same question – “On what basis does the Supreme Court
conclude that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists?” – four times. The first time he posed the
query, Justice Alito even presented the question as one with two possible answers – either a
descriptive answer (a reasonable expectation of privacy exists because most American assume they’d
have privacy in a particular context) or a normative answer (a reasonable expectation of privacy exists
because the justices think it ought to exist). Yet Mizner never answered Justice Alito’s question. 52
Justice Alito’s implication that the beliefs of actual Americans may provide the most satisfying
answer to the “reasonable expectations” conundrum also shows up strongly in his aforementioned
Jones concurrence. There he described Fourth Amendment reasonable expectations of privacy in a
manner that equated them with “popular attitudes,” and he warned of the dangers that arise when
judges gauge these attitudes by projecting their own beliefs onto those of the public as a whole. 53 He
referred at various times to reasonable expectations of privacy as “the average person’s expectations
51

United States v. Wurie (U.S. April 29, 2014), Oral Argument Transcript, available at 2014 WL 1694920, at *39*41. Wurie and Riley were consolidated into the Riley opinion.

52

Justice Souter posed essentially the same question to Kenneth Lerner, the lawyer for Danny Kyllo in the
landmark Fourth Amendment case of Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). See Oral Argument Transcript in
Kyllo v. United States, 2001 WL 168056, at *19 (Feb. 20, 2001) (“Justice Souter: So you’re saying that reasonable
expectation is in part based on fact, what you do, in fact, expect, and that informs, should inform the standard of
reasonable expectation, is that the nub of what you’re saying?” Mr. Lerner: Yes. It is partly what we all expect.”).
53

132 S. Ct. at 957, 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[J]udges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with
those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks. In addition, the Katz test rests on the
assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations.
But technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which
popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.”) (emphasis
added).
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about the privacy of his or her movements,” 54 treated “popular expectations” and “popular attitudes”
as synonymous, 55 and referenced the “circularity” of Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test, a
criticism that only resonates in the context of attitudes actually held by the public. 56 He differentiated
between what the public may prefer and what they may nevertheless believe and expect. 57 Finally, he
criticized Justice Scalia’s majority opinion for embracing a vision of the Constitution that treats
technological surveillance as a search, but old-fashioned surveillance that yields the same quantum of
information as a non-search. 58 To be sure, there is some ambiguity about what methodology Justice
Alito’s concurrence was applying; 59 authors of concurrences can get away with a lack of precision more
easily than authors of majority opinions. But on the whole, Justice Alito’s oral argument questioning in
Riley and the opinion he produced in Jones elevated the importance of the average member of the
public’s actual beliefs and suggested their centrality to the Katz inquiry.
We will defend Justice Alito’s apparent approach to this basic jurisprudential question and show
precisely how scientific polling can alleviate concerns that judges will place undue weight on their own
beliefs or the beliefs of people in their social orbits. We posit that under Katz v. United States, 60 the
Court should recognize subjective expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment when it

54

Id. at 963.

Id. at 962 (“Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and
may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.”).
55

Id. (“The Katz expectation-of-privacy test avoids the problems and complications noted above, but it is not
without its own difficulties. It involves a degree of circularity, and judges are apt to confuse their own expectations
of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks.”) (citations omitted). The
circularity critique holds that popular attitudes dictate judicial pronouncements about the state of the law, which
in turn dictate popular attitudes. See Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60-62
(2001); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 106-07 (2009). During oral arguments for the
pending case of City of Los Angeles v. Patel, Justice Kennedy asked counsel: “If you prevail in this case and a
member of the Court sits down to write the opinion, does he or she have to use the phrase "reasonable
expectation of privacy" and say there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in our society, in our culture, in our
day, or do we just forget that phrase? In in a way, as we all know it's circular, that if we say there is a reasonable
expectation, then there is.” See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, Oral Argument Transcript (March 3, 2015), at 13,
available at http://pub.bna.com/lw/131175US_argued.pdf (emphasis added).
56

57
132 S. Ct. at 957, 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (“New technology may provide increased convenience or security at
the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not
welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this
development as inevitable.”).

Id. at 961 (“Second, the Court’s approach leads to incongruous results. If the police attach a GPS device to a car
and use the device to follow the car for even a brief time, under the Court's theory, the Fourth Amendment
applies. But if the police follow the same car for a much longer period using unmarked cars and aerial assistance,
this tracking is not subject to any Fourth Amendment constraints.”).
58

Most puzzlingly, Justice Alito writes: “The Court argues—and I agree—that “we must ‘assure preservation of that
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’ ” But it is almost
impossible to think of late–18th-century situations that are analogous to what took place in this case.”) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). Justice Alito does not develop this thought any further, but there is little reason to
expect continuity in attitudes between 18th century Americans and 21st century Americans.
59

60

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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believes as an empirical matter that contemporary, ordinary Americans expect privacy in a particular
context.

B. Four Models of the Fourth Amendment?

Recall Katz’s two-prong test, with its focus on the suspect’s subjective expectation of privacy
and the question of whether such an expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. 61 Confusion has abounded in the decades since Katz about precisely what Justice Harlan
meant when he wrote the test and what the Supreme Court majority that subsequently adopted it took
it to mean. The consensus in the scholarship seems to be something like this. Katz prong one is nearly
always a non-issue because it is generally safe to assume a criminal defendant would not have exposed
incriminating information unless she believed she was not being monitored. This view is nicely
encapsulated in a new article by Orin Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective
Expectations. 62
Most of the scholarly and judicial discussion of Katz has therefore focused on the second prong
of the test: whether the privacy expectations are such “that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” Kerr has done important work in this area as well. In his 2007 article, Four Models of
Fourth Amendment Protection, he identifies four distinct threads in Supreme Court jurisprudence that
reflect divergent understandings of Katz’s second prong. 63 The first is what Kerr calls the “probabilistic
model.” This is a purely descriptive approach, one that “tries to assess the likelihood that a person will
be observed or a place investigated based on prevailing social practices.” 64 Kerr’s second approach is the
“the private facts model.” This model focuses on the sensitivity of the information at issue – if “the
government obtains information that is particularly private, then the acquisition of that information is a
search.” 65 If the information can only be indicative of criminal conduct – a dog’s detection of cocaine –
then gathering it likely is not a search. A third possibility is the “positive law model.” Under that
approach, the courts are to look to whether the government’s conduct would run afoul of some
independent legal framework other than the Fourth Amendment. 66 If the police enter the interior of a
home, for example, that is a search because it is also a trespass. Kerr notes that, in addition to property
law, federal regulations may also affect reasonable expectations of privacy under this model. 67 Finally,
Kerr examines the “policy model” under which the existence of a search depends on the answer to a
utilitarian balancing inquiry. Under this approach, “[j]udges must consider the consequences of

61

See supra text accompanying note 23.

Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (2015); see
also Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV.
409, 429 (“[I]n striking an appropriate balance between the two prongs of the Katz test, the Court has chosen to
weigh far more heavily the objective reasonableness inquiry.”).
62

Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007). Kerr’s article has already
been cited by seven different courts, as of December 2014.
63

64

Id. at 508.

65

Id. at 512.

66

Id. at 516-18.

67

Id. at 517 (citing Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)).
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regulating a particular type of government activity, weigh privacy and security interests, and opt for the
better rule.” 68
Kerr provides a long list of examples in which the Supreme Court has embraced, rejected, or
ignored these four approaches to addressing Katz’s second prong. 69 Sometimes several models are
applied to the same case by the Court, and sometimes the Court makes methodological
pronouncements that have a distinct “We have always been at war with Eastasia” quality to them. 70 But
Kerr finds some patterns. For example, the Supreme Court tends to employ the probabilistic model in
“group settings,” where the court can consider prevailing social norms that affect interactions among
non-governmental actions and the resulting expectations of privacy or publicity. 71 In the colloquy we
reproduced a few pages ago, Justice Alito was asking Judith Mizner whether, in Kerr’s terminology, the
Court should apply the “probabilistic model” or the “policy model” to decide whether individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of their cell phones. 72 Kerr argues that this state of
affairs, in which the Court picks and chooses which of these four models to apply, is desirable, 73 a
contention we find unpersuasive because of the risk of doctrinal incoherence and unpredictability. 74
It is worth emphasizing that Kerr’s helpful framework for analyzing Fourth Amendment
expectations predates Jones. Jones itself seemed to reject, at least provisionally and implicitly, some of
Kerr’s arguments. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion removes the “positive law” model from the Katz
framework, instead requiring that courts decide before reaching the Katz question whether law
enforcement conduct violated independent rights under applicable state property law. 75 We might then
regard the pre-Katz trespass / positive law inquiry as “Katz Step Zero.” 76 Justice Alito’s opinion, on the
other hand, argues in favor of integrating the question of what the positive law says into the Katz
framework itself. 77 Finally, while Kerr is right that the Supreme Court often considers cost-benefit
analysis germane to Katz prong 2 under the policy model, we believe the correct place to incorporate
68

Id. at 519.

Id. at 509-22. Kerr observes that the Court has never criticized the policy model, but they have ignored it plenty
of times. Id. at 521-22. Compare Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004
UTAH L. REV. 977, 1022-23 (identifying the Supreme Court’s inconsistent approaches to determining the
reasonableness of searches over time).
69

70

GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHT-FOUR (1949).

71

Kerr, supra note 63, at 544.

72

See supra text accompanying note 51.

73

Kerr, supra note 63, at 542.

It has also been argued that all of these models collapse into an overall assessment of intrusiveness. See, e.g.,
Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588,
1603 (2010).

74

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-51. The same methodology was employed by a majority of the Court in the subsequent
Fourth Amendment search case of Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013). The Court said that because the
police’s use of a drug sniffing dog on Jardines’ porch would have been a trespass and thus a search, it was
unnecessary for the courts to consider the Katz framework. Id.
75

We coin this phrase in homage to Sunstein’s important article. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L.
REV. 187 (2006).
76

77

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 959-60 (Alito, J., concurring).
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such analysis is the reasonableness inquiry that courts turn to if they decide that particular police
conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. 78 That reasonableness inquiry determines whether a
warrant or something less is required before the search can commence.

C. Surveys as a More Satisfying Methodology

In the remainder of this Part we will argue that public opinion data drawn from nationally
representative samples of the population ought to be dispositive on the question of Katz prong 1. In our
formulation, the question of whether there was a subjective expectation of privacy would be framed as
whether people in general expect privacy in a given situation. Just as Justice Scalia pulled the “positive
law” question out of the Katz framework, we would pull the “probabilistic” inquiry out of prong 2, and
make it the central question under Katz prong 1. A defendant wishing to claim that a surveillance
strategy constitutes a search would need to show that the populace 79 generally regards the law
enforcement conduct in question as a violation of privacy expectations. With positive law already
consigned to a Katz Step Zero analysis by Justice Scalia’s opinion in Jones, our approach would permit
courts to distill Katz prong two down to the “private facts” inquiry. This would allow for more objective
results than the cost-benefit balancing inquiry (i.e., Kerr’s “policy model”) and, unlike the policy model,
it isn’t duplicated elsewhere in Fourth Amendment law. 80
We feel that focusing Katz prong 1 on an empirical question is not only doctrinally elegant but
also normatively desirable. 81 The Fourth Amendment is designed to safeguard individuals against
governmental overreach. When there is a sharp divide between what the courts describe as the Fourth
Amendment’s scope and what the people actually expect the Fourth Amendment’s scope to be, various
problems arise. Law abiding people may take excessive precautions to protect their information,
keeping it not only from the state’s agents but also from third parties who could put the information to
productive uses. 82 Or citizens might make inordinate investments in learning the contours of Fourth
Amendment law, time and money that could be better spent elsewhere. Disconnects between actual
law and perceived law may also provide police officers and prosecutors with undue leverage over
78

For a description of the Supreme Court’s turn toward cost-benefit balancing in Fourth Amendment
reasonableness doctrine, see SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 21-47 (developing a proportionality principle of the
Fourth Amendment and showing how it is consistent with some of the Supreme Court’s case law); Clancy, supra
note 69, at 1003-15 (discussing the courts’ use of the balancing approach to Fourth Amendment reasonableness
determinations); Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 199, 223-47 (1993) (discussing the evolution of the case law during the Warren Court era); Cynthia Lee,
Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1159-60
(2012) (advocating a balancing approach that is not deferential to government actors’ asserted interests).
79

See infra text accompanying notes 139-141 for elaboration on how the populace is to be defined.

80

See infra text accompanying notes 148-154.

See also infra text accompanying notes 117-124 for further development of our normative argument. For
different, but largely congenial, accounts that argue for the centrality of privacy expectations in Fourth
Amendment inquiries, see Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Privacy as the Central Value Protected by the Fourth
Amendment’s Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches 12-17 (unpublished draft, on file with authors); Slobogin,
supra note 74, at 1602-04, 08.
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See Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 368-78 (2010); William J.
Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 794 (1989); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for
Secrecy’s Sake: Toward and Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 720
(1985).
82
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citizens. Although figuring out whether various possible interpretations of the Fourth Amendment
enhance social welfare is a tricky business, we think there is a strong case to be made that misalignment
between the law and social expectations is detrimental for both efficiency and fairness-related reasons.
So even though an empirical vision of “reasonable expectations of privacy” likely isn’t what Justice
Harlan had in mind when he penned his Katz concurrence, 83 there are good reasons why ordinary
citizens’ actual beliefs have become more doctrinally salient in the years that followed. 84
Katz prong 1 is, of course, only part of the threshold Fourth Amendment calculus. Though we
think that it should become the focal point for data-driven Fourth Amendment decisionmaking, there
are other places where incorporating survey results from nationally representative samples could
improve judicial decisionmaking. Namely, prong 2 of Katz asks whether society is prepared to recognize
a subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable, and data about the degree to which Americans regard
particular information as sensitive and embarrassing (Kerr’s “private facts” model) could figure in to this
calculus. Depending on one’s view of the Constitution, Americans’ normative views about the
desirability of requiring a warrant before a search could be conducted might be relevant under Katz
prong 2 as well.
It is important at this stage to underscore the difference between two related but distinct
empirical questions. One involves the privacy expectations of ordinary Americans. The other examines
the degree of perceived intrusion, embarrassment, and personal exposure created by the search. These
two inquiries are conceptually independent. 85 An example may help. A frequent flier will likely expect
deeply intrusive searches at airport security, but may still be embarrassed by them and concerned that
they will reveal sensitive personal information. Thus expectations are not violated, but intrusion still
occurs. Conversely a person might be greatly surprised if the government scrutinized his monthly natural
gas utility bills for the last several years, but may not feel the search embarrassed him or revealed
anything of importance about him. In our formulation, the perceived intrusiveness of a search is
potentially relevant under Katz prong 2, but the expectations of ordinary Americans should be
dispositive under Katz prong 1.
How would researchers go about measuring the public’s expectations of privacy? The most
obvious approach would be the one we use here, which is to ask a representative sample of Americans
such questions directly. There will inevitably be some heterogeneity in responses, but we should expect
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See supra text accompanying note 23; Kerr, supra note 62, at 124.
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To be clear, while there are Fourth Amendment decisions like Kyllo and Jardines in which originalist
considerations of what Founding Era citizens would have expected play a role, we do not regard the basic Katz test
as remotely originalist. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). Nor
do we think that present jurists interpreting Katz owe a duty of fidelity to whatever Justice Harlan intended when
he penned his concurrence in that case. Popular expectations of privacy do change over time, and under the Katz
line of cases it is implicit that the scope of constitutional protections will similarly fluctuate. See Monu Bedi,
Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 71 (2013).
Even originalism-friendly opinions like Jardines devote more space to discussing contemporary norms than
Founding Era norms, in part because evidence of the latter is so difficult to come by. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 141416. For a persuasive critique of Fourth Amendment originalism, see David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and
Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000). The question of how much privacy expectations change over time is
part of a long-term project that we are just beginning. See infra note 136.

As a practical matter, there are some connections between expectations and intrusiveness. See infra text
accompanying note 149.
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to find broad consensus around many questions involving law enforcement surveillance. 86 There are at
least two possible weaknesses to this approach. The first is that there may be a disconnect between
actual and reported attitudes. Survey instruments rely on cheap talk by respondents. Respondents have
no real skin in the game when we are asking them about their privacy expectations, and researchers
employ no lie detectors. As a result, respondents might answer questions in a way that reflects their
aspirations rather than their true expectations. 87
The problem of insincere respondents can never be discounted completely, but it is one with
which psychology and the other social sciences have come to terms. That isn’t to say that data about the
revealed preferences of Americans when it comes to privacy wouldn’t be better. It may be, 88 but it is
very difficult to collect, 89 especially in the same quantities that we are able to report here. Comfortingly,
the available evidence from various well-designed surveys is broadly consistent with observational
studies of revealed preferences. 90 In fact, there is a large psychological literature showing that
sufficiently specific attitude measures are often very good predictors of behavior. 91 A striking new study
from the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences is a particularly good example of this at the
group level. 92 In that study, social scientists took advantage of a feature of Swiss law by which voters
actually decided in a referendum whether individual citizenship applicants would be granted Swiss
citizenship. Ten years after the actual voting, the researchers presented a nationally representative
Swiss sample with profiles of citizenship applicants who had characteristics mirroring those of real
See generally Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy
in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE
L. J. 727, 737 (1993); Matthew B. Kugler, The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic Devices at the Border:
An Empirical Study, 82 UNIV. CHICAGO L. REV. 1165 (2014). In subsequent work, we will draw on other data we have
collected to show that it is common for there to be lay consensus on Fourth Amendment questions. See Matthew
B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity (in-progress).
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Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1522-23 (2010).

One approach to collecting such data in the privacy domain is described in Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social
Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 934-39, 970-73, 983-85 (2005) (discussing whether for the
purposes of invasion of privacy tort claims, “reasonable expectations of privacy” should be based on survey
research results or observational studies of consumer behavior that utilize social network theory).
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The price system sometimes permits the analysis of revealed preferences through large data sets. Unfortunately,
the price system does rather little to reveal the private value that Americans place on keeping the government
from learning information about them. For example, when someone decides to build a fence around her home, it
is difficult to determine the extent to which the purchase was driven by privacy concerns and the extent to which it
was driven by security concerns (thwarting trespassers, deterring burglars, etc.). Disentangling the two likely
requires surveying the purchaser, which brings us back to square one. The same entanglement can occur online,
with nearly all privacy-enhancements acting as simultaneous security enhancements.

See Sampo V. Paunonen, Big Five Factors of Personality and Replicated Predictions of Behavior, 84 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 411, 413-21 (2003) (surveying the literature and reporting on the results of original experiments
designed to test correlations between survey responses and observed behavior).
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Jens Hainmueller et al., Validating Vignette and Conjoint Survey Experiments Against Real-World Behavior, 112
PNAS 2395 (2015). Our study asks respondents to make a series of simultaneous pairwise comparisons regarding
the duration of surveillance. See infra text accompanying note 157 & tbl. 7.
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individuals from the earlier referendum. 93 When survey respondents were presented with multiple
citizenship applicants to choose from, the applicant demographic factors that were outcome
determinative in the referendum were also outcome determinative in the subsequent hypothetical
survey. 94 Social scientists also can use survey strategies to weed out disinterested or insincere
respondents, thereby enhancing the correlation between survey responses and actual beliefs. We
describe our use of this technique below. 95
The second potential weakness is that consultation of public attitudes may lead to circularity. By
this account, social expectations will change as the law does, such that expectations will eventually
conform with policies that were initially rejected. 96 To lay our cards on the table, we are unimpressed
with the circularity claim. As part of a future project, we have collected significant amounts of data
about the extent to which well-publicized legal changes affect ordinary Americans’ articulated
expectations of privacy. That data, which will form the core of our next paper, indicate that even
landmark Fourth Amendment decisions move the needle of Americans’ articulated expectations of
privacy very little. 97 A unanimous, well-publicized Supreme Court opinion on cell phone privacy barely
affected public expectations on the issue before the Court, and this was true whether respondents were
questioned a week after the decision was handed down or nearly a year later. Our data indicates that
the real world effects of the Fourth Amendment’s supposed circularity problem are overblown.
Other scholars have previously advocated assessing “reasonable expectations of privacy” using a
survey instrument. Christopher Slobogin is the legal scholar who has pioneered this approach. 98
Slobogin has surveyed students 99 and jury pool respondents 100 to gauge the perceived intrusiveness of
93

Id. at 2396.

Id. at 2397-98; see also id. at 2400 (“Our main finding is that the stated preference experiments, which simulated
the naturalization referendums in the survey, perform remarkably well in capturing the structural effects of
attributes that drive voting behavior in actual referendums.”). While the survey respondents and voters identified
the same demographic factors as most salient in shaping attitudes towards citizenship seekers, there were
discrepancies between the absolute vote totals in the survey and the referendum, a gap that might be explained
by the ten year temporal gap between the referendum and survey or by other factors affecting external validity. Id.
at 2399-2400.
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See infra text accompanying note 155.

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test . . . involves a degree of circularity.”); Kerr, supra note 63, at 532 (“[I]magine
the government announced that the FBI is tapping every single telephone call in the United States to listen for
evidence of criminal activity. The invasions of privacy would be extraordinarily severe but no reasonable person
would expect privacy in their calls after learning of this fact.”).
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See Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 86.

See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 21; Slobogin, supra note 74, at 1588; Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 86, at
727.
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Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 98, at 737. The identities of Slobogin’s research subjects has troubled some,
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various governmental surveillance techniques. Note a distinction between our research and his on this
point; we emphasize expectations of privacy rather than intrusiveness. A key finding from Slobogin’s
research is that while respondents’ opinions typically track judicial attitudes about whether the
technique at issue constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, scattered and important
divergences do arise. 101 For example, police use of undercover informants does not amount to a search
under Fourth Amendment precedents like Hoffa v. United States, 102 but Slobogin and Joseph
Schumacher found that respondents regard such government investigative techniques as more intrusive
than other techniques that the courts have consistently held to be Fourth Amendment searches. 103
An admitted problem with respect to research by Slobogin and others is that it has not been
conducted on a nationally representative sample of Americans. 104 Students obviously skew much
younger than the general population, and the jury pool in a particular town will not reflect national
sentiment. It is only in the last few years that legal scholars influenced by Slobogin’s methods have
begun examining the privacy preferences of Americans in a more empirically sound way. The trend owes
much to the steeply declining costs of survey research. For example, in 2012 scholars at Berkeley
commissioned a poll to assess the attitudes of Americans on the question of whether law enforcement
should be required to get a warrant before searching a cell phone incident to an arrest. 105 Some of the
same scholars followed up in 2014 with a nationally representative study of consumer privacy
attitudes. 106 That said, no externally valid recent study delves deeply into Americans’ Fourth
Amendment attitudes. 107 While Slobogin himself has written about Jones, his paper on the subject did
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Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 98, at 740, 738 tbl. 1 (noting that the use of a secretary as an undercover
agent is deemed noticeably more intrusive by respondents than the search of an office drawer).
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Jennifer M. Urban et al., Mobile Phones and Privacy 10 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103405
(visited Dec. 8, 2014).
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(2014).
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We know of only one additional contemporary paper that uses a nationally representative sample to track
changes in attitudes about legal questions pending in the courts – Katerina Linos & Kimberly Twist, The Supreme
Court, the Media, and Public Opinion: Comparing Experimental and Observational Methods (2015 unpublished
working paper, on file with author). Linos and Twist’s sophisticated paper does not examine any Fourth
Amendment issues.
Another paper, which post-dates ours by a little while, analyzes the public’s normative attitudes about
Fourth Amendment issues. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward et al., Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal
Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age (July 20, 2015 unpublished working paper, on file with author). Though
the Scott-Hayward and co-authors paper is well-done in many respects, our research strongly suggests that it
suffers from serious external validity problems. The paper uses a Mechanical Turk sample as a proxy for ordinary
Americans’ attitudes. Id. at 41-42. As our research shows, Mechanical Turk respondents are significantly more
privacy-protective than the general U.S. population, perhaps because they skew younger. See infra note 208 and
accompanying text. The size of the discrepancy between our representative sample and Mechanical Turk findings
was far larger than we, at least, would have expected, and far larger than we are comfortable with. We therefore
believe that one cannot use Mechanical Turk samples to assess the base rate support for privacy-related beliefs in
the general population. It may, however, still be valid to use such samples to evaluate the relative intrusiveness of
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not draw on any new empirical research about public attitudes towards the mosaic theory, so he never
posed Justice Alito’s “duration sensitivity” question to research subjects. 108 As a result, there is a dearth
of literature on what Americans actually believe with respect to the constitutional issues that the state
and federal courts must decide every day. If a judge wanted to follow the probabilistic model in a given
case, she would have to decide between relying on dated studies whose external validity has not been
established 109 and relying on guesswork, a straw poll of acquaintances, or other pseudo-scientific
approaches.
Even setting aside questions about external validity, Slobogin’s survey-based approach has been
challenged on other grounds. Scholars wonder whether courts have the capacity to assess popular
attitudes, 110 whether popular attitudes will fluctuate wildly from day to day, 111 why the content of
constitutional provisions should hinge on those attitudes as opposed to doctrines grounded in prior
constitutional and property-related precedents, 112 and whether popular attitudes about complicated
legal and technological issues are meaningful. 113 Slobogin has responded to some of these criticisms,
searches. We do not have data specifically on that point. The Scott-Hayward paper also argues that the public’s
normative beliefs, not its expectations, are relevant, relying on the circularity hypothesis that our subsequent work
debunks. Id. at 39-40.
We also note the existence of Marc McAllister, GPS and Cell Phone Tracking: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 207 (2013). The study was written by a former academic who does not appear
to have significant empirical training himself but hired an “instructional design consultant” to help him construct
two surveys about cell-phone search attitudes. Id. at 212. McAllister’s results are reported in an odd way. As best
we can tell, the article never tells us who any of his 230 survey respondents for the first survey are, how they were
recruited (students? Mechanical Turk? a survey firm? something else?), or whether the sample was representative.
Id. at 212, 236-47. No demographic information about the respondents is provided. None of his data is reported in
a way that comports with general standards of social science. In any event, McAllister’s study assumed that
respondents would have strong feelings about the differential duration of surveillance, though the way he set up
the relevant question there was evidently no real opportunity for respondents to indicate duration insensitivity. Id.
at 241-42. An earlier study by McAllister has the same methodological deficiencies. See Marc McAllister, The
Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475 (2012).
Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory
Implementation of Mosaic Theory, Vanderbilt Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 12-29 (July 11, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2098002. Slobogin’s paper is more doctrinal than
empirical, and it winds up proposing that surveillance lasting longer than 48 hours generally require a warrant
based on probable cause. Id. at 24. The 48-hour threshold is not driven by his survey results. Our data shows that
this 48-hour distinction is not salient to American citizens. See infra Table 3 (showing very little difference in
attitudes concerning 1-day surveillance and 1-week surveillance).
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See, e.g., Solove, supra note 87, at 1522; Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure, and the Positive Law: Expectations of
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noting, for example that courts routinely interpret survey results in other contexts, like trademark
litigation. 114 And he points out that replication should alleviate concerns about random sample
fluctuations. 115 We believe Slobogin acquits himself well in the debate and our studies support many of
his points. Notably, our own data on privacy expectations shows nearly perfect stability over a time span
of almost a year. 116
That said, concerns about turning public opinion into constitutional doctrine remain. Absent the
development of a public choice account for police practices and democratic failures, it is unclear why
the content of constitutional law should depend on upholding popular sentiment. We have developed
only a brief account here, 117 mostly taking the Katz Court’s invocation of “reasonable expectations of
privacy” as the Fourth Amendment lodestar as a given. We do think that the case for placing great
weight on survey responses is strongest when lay people are being surveyed on issues that are familiar
to them. For that reason, our surveys ask people about the sorts of technologies that they are likely to
have encountered in the world, like email accounts, smartphones, car-based navigation systems, and
computer webcams. With respect to less familiar technology, survey designers must do more work
explaining the underlying technology to respondents, increasing the danger that responses will be
influenced by the researchers’ subjective judgments about how to describe the technology.
In assessing our approach it is important to avoid the mistake of comparing an admittedly
imperfect survey-based methodology to an idealized alternative. If all judges were well-informed
philosopher kings, then there would be good reasons to allow them to decide all Fourth Amendment
questions on purely normative grounds. But judges are imperfect too. They have their own biases, their
own limitations, and their own misimpressions, 118 and there is a danger that the effects of these biases
will be magnified when constitutional law is decided by just nine people, three people, or one person.
The system loses the benefits of aggregating the factual impressions of a large sample, 119 and enhances
the risk that the idiosyncratic characteristics of the unrepresentative decision makers will systematically
distort their assessments of the social tradeoffs.
Nevertheless, there are alternatives to basing “reasonable expectations of privacy” on what
ordinary Americans actually say they expect. To recall Kerr’s framework, the law might use precedents
derived from external sources of law, like state property law, to define reasonable expectations.
Alternatively, the law might focus on how sensitive the information sought by the government is. Finally,
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See Table 9 (comparing the results of wave 3 to those of waves 1 and 2); see also infra note 159 (noting that
wave 1 and wave 2 of our surveys were statistically indistinguishable on questions concerning Jones).
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People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 183-192 (2007) (describing
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the courts could engage in a utilitarian balancing calculus, weighing the privacy costs and security
benefits of requiring a warrant when the government seeks information of a particular kind. 120
A chief virtue of drawing on popular opinion is that it lends itself to quantifiable results,
oftentimes more so than the alternatives. Suppose the Supreme Court is confronted with a new
question – does the Fourth Amendment prohibit the NSA’s warrantless collection of metadata
concerning email and telephone traffic from tens of millions of Americans? 121 Figuring out whether the
NSA’s program satisfies a cost-benefit calculus is close to impossible given the limits of available
knowledge. Public opinion data, however, furnishes one highly relevant data point in such a calculus by
providing a measure of the extent to which the program enhances or diminishes Americans’ sense of
freedom and safety. That sort of data can be obtained at a relatively low cost through the sorts of
surveys we describe below.
Nearly all the other data relevant to a rigorous cost-benefit inquiry would be much more
difficult to obtain. Assuming the program is challenged in court within a few years of its implementation,
nobody is likely to have a handle on the extent to which the program produces actionable intelligence,
the costs of security officials’ time spent responding to false leads generated by the program, the extent
to which its existence chills commerce, the effect the program may have on political expression and the
consequences for democracy of marginally more inhibited communications, the danger that information
stored in the database will eventually fall into the hands of America’s enemies through espionage or
hacking, and a host of other pertinent considerations. Courts do their best to muddle through these
extremely difficult issues, but it appears likely that at the time of the suit they will have before them
reasonably accurate information about the government’s out of pocket expenditures on the NSA
program, some statements from civil libertarians expressing alarm at the existence of the program, and
little else of probative value. 122 Like the person on the street who looks for a lost object under a
streetlight, because “that’s where the best light is,” judges may focus unduly on the relatively
insignificant “known knowns,” while ignoring the vastly more important “known unknowns.” Worse yet,
they may use unreliable guesswork or their ideological priors to assess the importance of the known
unknowns. The notion that the results generated by such an inquiry will be reliable and predictable ex
ante is hard to defend. 123 By contrast, conducting a poll to assess popular attitudes about NSA
See supra text accompanying notes 63-68. Of course, the courts could substitute a deontological framework for
a consequentialist one in assessing the propriety of government surveillance. See Sklansky, supra note 14, at 111015.
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See generally Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that parts of the NSA program are
searches); Smith v. Obama (9th Cir.) (argued Dec. 8, 2014) (still pending on appeal).
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The cost-benefit calculus may be more manageable when used to evaluate more routine and familiar law
enforcement strategies like stop-and-frisks or roadblocks, though we should not kid ourselves about the ease of
evaluating such policies empirically. None of this is to suggest that there is no role for welfarism in the law. Rather,
the suggestion is that when technologies and law enforcement strategies whose effects are uncertain are at issue,
the results of welfarist analysis will be unpredictable and unreliable. Survey research, which is relatively objective,
and which may both inform and be influenced by welfarist considerations, is plausibly a more appealing place to
look when evaluating the law enforcement strategy’s legality.
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Although the NSA example we reference above is one where precise balancing is exceedingly difficult, we are
inclined to think that analytical difficulty is more the rule than the exception. Consider the Supreme Court’s most
recent Fourth Amendment controversies – Must the police get a warrant before searching a cell phone incident to
its owners’ arrest? Must the police get a warrant before searching a hotel’s guest registry? Should the police need
a warrant to search the curtilage of a private residence with a drug sniffing dog? It is perhaps not unduly
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Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment is cheap and quick, at least for people with the pertinent
technical training. 124 Social scientists employing divergent methodologies are going to obtain broadly
consistent results provided they use state of the art techniques for assessing popular sentiment.
A final point about the policy model is worth underscoring. There is already plenty of room
elsewhere in Fourth Amendment doctrine for the courts to engage in a cost-benefit balancing process.
The determination that police conduct amounted to a search does not resolve the Fourth Amendment
questions. Rather, once police conduct is found to have amounted to a search, the courts then shift their
attention to the question of whether the police’s conduct was reasonable. 125 As it has evolved in recent
decades, this judicial inquiry often focuses on a balancing approach that weighs the costs and benefits of
the government conduct at issue. 126 Considering the utilitarian calculus with respect to both the scope
of the Fourth Amendment and the question of whether dispensing with the warrant requirement,
probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or some other safeguard is appropriate double counts utilitarian
interests, potentially slanting the doctrine against finding violations of the Constitution. 127
Now suppose that in light of all the problems with collecting accurate data that informs Kerr’s
“policy model” of decisionmaking, a court pivots to the “private facts” model, where the sensitivity of
the information the government collects (or intends to collect) determines the likelihood of the
collection amounting to a Fourth Amendment “search.” Resolving questions about sensitivity without
the benefit of survey research has some of the same problems as the policy model, though they are less
pronounced. Determining what information counts as sensitive requires numerous subjective
judgments. Sensitivity depends a great deal on context, on the identity of the recipient of the
information, on the preferences of the data privacy subject, the risks posed by present or future
disclosure, and the priors of the person evaluating the information. 128 People and even cultures are
heterogeneous with respect to what information about themselves they are willing to share, with whom
they are willing to share it, and under what circumstances sharing is appropriate. 129 Differences in
burdensome to assess costs and benefits in a back-of-the-envelope way, but to develop an answer that satisfies
rigorous cost-benefit analysis would entail running randomized controlled experiments, assessing difficult-tomeasure chilled economic activity, conducting willingness-to-pay surveys, conducting observational studies of gang
behavior, and then assessing how a change in a legal rule would affect these measures. The error bars around
courts’ initial assessments are going to be very high.
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The out of pocket cost for our large-sample survey was $4550. Obviously, this figure does not include the
authors’ imputed wages for designing the survey and analyzing the results.
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Some readers and courts might prefer to see a purely normative judicial inquiry in Katz step 2 and the
incorporation of survey data about sensitivity and embarrassment into the reasonableness inquiry. We think there
is a case to be made for that approach instead of the one we advocate in the text. What we object to is redundant
double-counting.
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individuals’ psychological worldviews contribute to this heterogeneity, 130 and the result is that it can be
difficult to determine what counts as sensitive. Also, information that was not sensitive when collected
may become more sensitive over time. Data that individuals purchase lotions and multivitamins at a
department store likewise seems unobjectionable, but the banal becomes highly sensitive when data
mining shows that many women who start making certain purchases suddenly are quite likely to be in
the early stages of pregnancy. 131 Similarly, municipal data sets showing taxi drivers’ trip patterns seem
innocuous enough until a data miner discovers that Muslim drivers can be identified because they are
invariably inactive during the daily calls to prayer. 132 That said, the “private facts” model may permit the
state to develop workable rules of thumb for both the police and citizenry. Police usually know what
kind of information they are seeking and are likely to encounter. In that sense, it is a more workable
alternative to the policy approach.
Yet this again leads us to public opinion data. The best way to address the question of sensitivity
in an objective and replicable way is to poll a representative sample of ordinary Americans and see what
they say is sensitive. Christopher Slobogin has shown exactly how this sort of research can be done,
constructing a hierarchy of more- and less-sensitive data based on popular attitudes. 133 Taking a
shortcut by substituting judicial hunches for the actual view of the populace seems particularly
misguided. To be sure, there may be some easy cases where judges will conclude, uncontroversially,
that information is highly sensitive (take social security numbers, for example 134), but in these easy cases
survey respondents will get the answer right too. 135
And here is the rub. We want law enforcement and security personnel to be able to assess the
legality of such programs ex ante. Assessing the social welfare effects of a new investigative technique is
even harder ex ante than it would be ex post, but decisions to greenlight an investigative strategy have
to be made ex ante. Can a local police chief or CIA director commission a poll where she hires reputable
survey researchers to figure out where public sentiment is on dozens of new investigative techniques
that the department or agency is considering implementing? Yes, and she can do so on a tight budget
these days. A good social scientist might be hired to design and run a survey for less than the price of
ten or twenty outside counsel billable hours, 136 and if even that is too pricey our own aim is to collect
lots of this data over time and make it freely available on the Internet. We provide some of that data in
Matthew B. Kugler, Affinities in Privacy Attitudes: A Psychological Approach to Unifying Informational and
Decisional Privacy, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2469562>.
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Table 13. Evaluating the likelihood that information the government collects will be regarded as
sensitive down the road is more difficult. Assessing ex ante whether a court is likely to view warrantless
surveillance as satisfying a cost-benefit test is harder still, especially when a new program is under
consideration. If courts were to deem survey data legally salient, they would be imposing manageable
burdens on law enforcement.

D. How Survey Research Can Restore Coherence to Katz Doctrine

This brings us to our final point before we dive into the data. Recall the place we started. The
Supreme Court’s Katz test is articulated as a two-prong inquiry – the courts are to look to subjective
and objective expectations of privacy. Yet it appears that Katz’s subjective prong has atrophied, a
development that Orin Kerr attributes to a misreading of Justice Harlan’s original Katz opinion by the
Supreme Court in cases like Smith v. Maryland, which articulated Katz’s subjective prong in terms of
how much privacy a reasonable defendant would expect with respect to numbers he dialed into a land
line telephone’s handset. 137 But what if there is a better way to be faithful to both Smith and the
version of Katz that emerged from Jones?
Combining Smith v. Maryland with Jones one could instead apply the Katz test in three steps.
Beginning with Katz Step Zero, through the lens of Jones, one would ask whether the police’s conduct
infringed on a suspect’s property right. If the police committed a trespass, then the conduct amounts to
a search and the courts need only ask whether the warrantless search was reasonable. Second,
assuming there was no trespass, a court would apply Katz’s two traditional prongs. For prong 1, it
would examine whether the defendant expected privacy in a particular situation. Because getting
inside the defendant’s head is hard, and it will always be tempting for a defendant to claim falsely (for
the benefit of an evidentiary motion) that he did, in fact, expect privacy in a particular situation, 138 the
law should use the sentiments of the median American citizen as a proxy for the defendant’s subjective
expectation of privacy. If more Americans would have expected privacy in a particular situation than
not, it is reasonable to assume that the defendant did too. Arguably even a lower threshold should be
used. 139 Indeed, in our view, if most members of a discrete and insular minority would expect privacy in
a particular setting, then Katz prong 1 should be satisfied regardless of whether a particular defendant
137

See Kerr, supra note 62, at 128-33.
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It is perhaps puzzling why the law should care inherently about the individual defendant’s actual expectation of
privacy. If the defendant understood that he was exposing incriminating information to public scrutiny, but did so
anyway and got caught, then the subjective portion of the test would seem to punish relatively astute criminals
and protect relatively clueless ones. See Cloud, supra note 78, at 250. It might also benefit risk averse defendants
and disadvantage risk seekers. It is hard to think of a good justification for these effects. Perhaps theories of
consent explain the subjective inquiry. Information starts out with the individual and we want the law to respect
personal choices to keep it private or expose it to the public. But given that courts articulate precedents that guide
thousands of people who will never litigate, a long digression in a published opinion about whether a particular
individual actually expected privacy seems less helpful than a generally applicable inquiry into whether most
people actually would have expected privacy in a (recurring) circumstances. From an ex ante perspective,
improving the alignment between the law and expected outcomes reduces the transaction costs associated with
learning the law and modifying one’s behavior by taking excessive or inadequate precautions. See supra text
accompanying note 82-83.
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happens to be a member of that discrete and insular minority. In our data set, neither race nor gender
has any measurable association with privacy expectations towards GPS tracking. But we can imagine
situations in which race or gender could influence peoples’ expectations, and in those instances we
want to make sure that the law protects potentially marginalized subgroup members. 140 To do that in a
manner consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, Fourth Amendment doctrine likely needs to
protect everyone. 141
Assuming the police acted in a way contrary to the expectations of the median American or the
median American of a protected class, the court would shift its attention to Katz’s second prong –
whether the defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy is one society is prepared to accept as
reasonable. Because Jones moved the “positive law” inquiry outside of Katz and our doctrinal
suggestion moves the “probabilistic” model from Katz prong 2 to Katz prong 1, the second prong of
Katz now gives the courts an opportunity to consider the “private facts” model, either alone or in
conjunction with the “policy” model. Here too, public opinion data may be relevant. Courts must have a
sense of what information is considered “private” to assess whether a particular technique implicates
sensitive “private facts.” If the Jones majority’s efforts to move property law to a pre-Katz inquiry prove
unsuccessful, courts would also integrate their analysis of existing property law protections into Katz’s
second prong.
We think this approach is basically what the Supreme Court was trying to do in Smith v.
Maryland, though the Court’s execution left much to be desired. In Smith the issue before the Court
was whether law enforcement’s use of a pen register to record all the numbers dialed on a suspect’s
phone amounted to a search. The Court began by examining Katz’s first prong. As the Court saw it:
[W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the
numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must “convey” phone numbers
to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment
that their calls are completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone
company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they
see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills. . . . Although most
people may be oblivious to a pen register’s esoteric functions, they presumably have
some awareness of one common use: to aid in the identification of persons making
A good example is Safford Unified School District # 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009), a case involving a school’s
search of a thirteen-year-old girl’s undergarments. Justice Ginsburg said that during the justices’ arguments about
the case, she was able to convince her colleagues that a thirteen year old girl has different concerns and
expectations about being forced to remove her clothes than a thirteen year old boy. See Emily Bazelon, The Place
of Women on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at MM22. (“Q: What about the case this term involving the strip
search, in school, of 13-year-old Savana Redding? Justice Souter’s majority opinion, finding that the strip search
was unconstitutional, is very different from what I expected after oral argument, when some of the men on the
court didn’t seem to see the seriousness here. Is that an example of a case when having a woman as part of the
conversation was important? JUSTICE GINSBURG: I think it makes people stop and think, Maybe a 13-year-old girl
is different from a 13-year-old boy in terms of how humiliating it is to be seen undressed. I think many of [the male
justices] first thought of their own reaction. It came out in various questions. You change your clothes in the gym,
what’s the big deal?”).
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Under our framework the existence of privacy expectations among some oddly configured and obscure
subgroup – say, Buddhist soccer moms in suburban Nebraska – would be insufficient to create reasonable
expectations of privacy for everyone. Were it otherwise, then data miners could always satisfy our Katz prong 1
test. That is why we focus on discrete and insular minorities here.
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annoying or obscene calls. . . . Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must
convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone company has
facilities for recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record
this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes. Although subjective
expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that telephone
subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the
numbers they dial will remain secret. 142
The Court recognizes the difficulty of figuring out what Smith thought, so it pivots to the question of
what people in general think about the privacy of call information. To be sure, its empirical intuitions
were likely off-base. It cited no evidence for its broad assertions about what “all telephone users” and
“most people” believed in the 1970’s and some of its factual inferences seem to assume a higher level
of sophistication than ordinary Americans typically possess. 143
Counsel for Smith argued to the Court that regardless of what “telephone users in general”
thought when they dialed their numbers, Smith himself expected privacy because he placed the call
from inside his residence. 144 The Court rejected this argument too, once again drawing on the views of
telephone users in general to do so. As the Court wrote, “Regardless of his location, petitioner had to
convey that number to the telephone company in precisely the same way if he wished to complete his
call. The fact that he dialed the number on his home phone rather than on some other phone could
make no conceivable difference, nor could any subscriber rationally think that it would.” 145 With this
sentence, the Court indicated that it hardly cared what Smith himself thought. 146 A rational subscriber
could not expect that the numbers he dialed would remain private, so Smith would still lose under
prong 1. The Court then noted that “even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the
phone numbers he dialed would remain private,” such an expectation would not satisfy Katz’s objective
prong. 147
In summary, then, we believe there is a good case to be made for interpreting Fourth
Amendment law in a manner consistent with Smith v. Maryland but in some tension with other
pronouncements by the Court. Rather than throwing overboard the first prong of Katz’s canonical test,
as some courts seem to be doing, 148 we would propose resuscitating it by making popular expectations
central to the inquiry of whether an individual maintained reasonable expectations of privacy in a
particular setting. The costs of obtaining reliable evidence about such expectation have fallen
dramatically, and with those diminished costs comes increased predictability. Under our approach,
popular sentiment gauged by reliable social science methods would become a necessary (though not
142
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See Smith, 442 U.S. at 748-49 & n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) The Court played fast-and-loose with some facts.
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sufficient) element of a court’s determination that a particular investigative technique amounted to a
search. If survey results suggested that the use of technology violated people’s expectations, then the
courts would turn to an examination of the sensitivity of the information sought and obtained.
We want to make two final points before concluding this Part. First, there will surely be some
overlap between expectations and sensitivity. Police surveillance into the interior of a home is deeply
troublesome to people both because of what the investigation looks like and what it reveals. Indeed, it
is very interesting that while both Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor arguably embraced the mosaic
theory in Jones, Alito focused on popular expectations in his articulation of the mosaic theory and
Sotomayor emphasized the sensitivity of the information gathered through long-term surveillance. 149
Second, though both our approach and Slobogin’s approach are driven by survey data, we use that data
in different ways. Slobogin uses survey results to assemble a hierarchy of searches, scaled to the
perceived intrusiveness of the search, and then balances the proportional costs of that intrusiveness
against the security benefits of the surveillance. 150 His surveys invite normative judgments on the part
of laypeople, and some subsequent researchers have done likewise. 151 We, by contrast, are primarily
asking for descriptive assessment by laypeople – how unexpected would this be? – and then are using
our responses to slide into the existing Katz framework for determining the Fourth Amendment’s
scope. So while there are important commonalities and areas of agreement, we are collecting more
representative data, about different questions, and putting that data to a divergent doctrinal use. That
said, we think a data-driven approach to determining sensitivity – along the lines suggested by Slobogin
– would be worthwhile. In part to promote dialogue between his approach and ours, we asked the
traditional Slobogin intrusiveness question in wave 3 and describe how it relates to the expectation
data in Part III.F.
Having made the case for survey research’s relevance, we will now present the results of our
research into the public’s attitudes regarding the key open doctrinal issue left open by United States v.
Jones. When law enforcement obtains geolocation information from a criminal suspect without
effecting a trespass onto land or chattels, how long can the surveillance continue before a warrant is
required?

III.

Empirical Data about Views on Surveillance Duration

So far we have shown that the lower courts are divided about how to deal with Justice Alito’s
suggestion in Jones that the duration of geolocation surveillance will be a decisive consideration in
determining whether it is a search. We have also shown the potential utility of using public opinion
surveys to help resolve the duration-salience question and, for that matter, other Fourth Amendment
questions about what constitutes a search. Our discussion suggests that hard data about Americans’
expressed beliefs is, at a minimum, highly relevant to the constitutional inquiry. At best, the data could
be dispositive in many cases.
But this raises an obvious problem. What if the American people are as divided as the courts
are over the question of duration salience? If there is no clear consensus about the importance of
geolocation-tracking surveillance, then a resort to survey research will achieve little good. Happily, it
Compare Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962-63 (Alito, J., concurring), with Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
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turns out that American citizens have coalesced around two clear points of consensus. First, the
duration of geolocation tracking strikes the lion’s share of Americans as irrelevant to the question of
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated. Second, Americans are nearly two and
a half times more likely to view geolocation surveillance of any duration as infringing a reasonable
expectation of privacy as they are to reach the opposite conclusion. 152

A.

Participants, Procedure, and Measures for Waves One and Two

A weighted sample of adult Americans was recruited by Toluna, a professional survey firm with
an established panel. 153 The sample was drawn to mirror closely the American population as a whole
across various demographic dimensions. The panel was recruited in two waves but, as there are no
differences between waves on any of the relevant measures, the results are combined for most of our
data analysis. 154 The final sample contained 1461 participants, all of whom were adult US Citizens. 155 The
median age was 51 (range 18-95, M = 48.56, SD = 16.80). 51.3% of the sample was female. Slightly more
of the sample than the national population as a whole had completed at least some college coursework,
but otherwise the educational attainment of the sample was roughly equivalent to that of the broader
population. 156 80.6% of the sample identified as White, 11.5% as Black, and 4.6% as South or East Asian.
On a separate question, 16.7% reported identifying as Hispanic or Latino. When asked to rate their
political orientation on a scale ranging from 1 – Very Liberal to 7 – Very Conservative, the mean
response was 4.23 (SD = 1.72), indicating a politically moderate sample. Participants were also assessed
on a variety of dimensions including the Big 5 of personality, authoritarian submission, media
consumption habits, and their knowledge about the Supreme Court.
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Wave one data were gathered June 11-12, 2014. Wave two data were gathered July 1-2, 2014. There were
differences between these waves on other measures, but those differences are not relevant to this project.
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The survey instrument contained a question directing participants to show that they were paying attention by
selecting a particular answer choice. Only participants who responded correctly to this question were included in
the analysis.
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In the sample, 14.1% had graduate degrees, 28.7% had four year college degrees, 23.3% had two year degrees,
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12.7% of those 35–39 have graduate degrees, a further 22.6% have four year degrees, 10.8% have two year
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high school degree. See United States Census Bureau, Educational Attainment in the United States: 2012 – Detailed
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For the key question, participants were asked whether it would “violate people’s reasonable
expectations of privacy if law enforcement”
1.)
2.)
3.)
4.)

Used a car’s onboard GPS system to locate it on public streets without the owner’s
permission?
Used a car’s onboard GPS system to track its movements on public streets for one day
without the owner’s permission?
Same, but for one week?
Same, but for one month?

Participants answered these four questions on response scales that ranged from 1 – Definitely
Not to 5 – Definitely Yes. The questions asked about the use of a car’s own GPS system – rather than a
GPS tracking device installed by police – to better reflect the types of non-trespass cases that have
arisen in the wake of Jones. 157

B.

Main Results

Most obviously, the participants were more likely than not to believe that this type of GPS
tracking represented a violation of reasonable expectations of privacy. As can be seen in Table 1,
roughly twice as many participants scored above rather than below the scale’s midpoint on each
question. Also, the response mean was significantly above the scale’s midpoint for each of the four
questions. 158 These data therefore provide a clear answer to whether GPS tracking violates reasonable
expectations of privacy in the eyes of ordinary citizens.
In addition to this baseline expectation of privacy, there was a small yet discernable effect of
tracking duration. 159 People were more inclined to say that a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy
is violated by month-long tracking than by week-long, more by week-long than day-long, more by daylong than instantaneous. 160
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See notes 30 – 40 and accompanying text. We avoided asking about the duration of geolocation tracking via cell
phone towers because we knew the Riley case, involving the privacy of cell phone contents when the phone’s
owner is arrested, would be decided between wave 1 and wave 2 and we did not want media coverage of the
opinion to influence responses to our question.
158
One-sample t tests revealed that all mean scores were significantly above the scale’s midpoint value of 3. t
values for locate, one day, one week, and one month were 10.29, 13.42, 14.48, and 15.41 respectively. All are
significant at the p < .001 level.
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A mixed analysis of variance was conducted to examine whether there were consistent differences between
participants’ responses to the four GPS tracking questions. As mentioned above, there were no effects of wave and
no interaction between wave and item. Wave: F(1, 1459) = .82, p =.37; interaction F(1.98, 2884.80) = .16, p =.85.
This means that there were no differences on any of the items across waves and that the pattern of responses
across items (whether tracking for one duration was different than for another) did not vary in each wave
The within-subjects portion of this type of mixed analysis of variance assume that the difference score created
when comparing condition A to B has the same variance as that created by comparing B to C, and so on. When that
assumption of sphericity is violated, the commonly accepted solution is to use a Greenhouse-Geisser correction to
adjust the degrees of freedom for the within-subjects portions of the analysis. Here, a sphericity violation was
found using Mauchly’s test and the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was employed.
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Table 1: Effect of Duration on Privacy Expectation.
Mean

Std. Deviation

Percent below
midpoint

Percent above
midpoint

Locate

3.41

(1.51)

28%

51%

Track 1 Day

3.53

(1.51)

25%

56%

Track 1 Week

3.57

(1.51)

25%

58%

Track 1 Month

3.61

(1.51)

24%

59%

Reponses were on a 1 -5 scale with higher values corresponding with greater invasion of privacy. All
pairwise comparisons are significant.
This effect of duration on expectations hides an underlying consistency in responses across
measure, however. Most participants give the same response to each of these four questions, and only
a handful show the kind of rising trend pattern implied by the gradually increasing means. As can be
seen in Table 2, nearly forty percent of respondents consistently reported that people’s expectations of
privacy would be violated for all searches (giving ratings of all fours or all fives). 161 A further 16.9%
consistently reported that they believed expectations of privacy were not violated (all 1s or all 2s), and
11% consistently gave the middle response (all 3s). Only 5.3% gave responses that started low – stating
that expectations of privacy were not violated – and ended high. This is the pattern of responses that
would be consistent with Justice Alito’s view in Jones that surveillance duration is highly salient, and it
was nearly eight-times less popular than the view that all durations of geolocation tracking equally
violate people’s expectations of privacy. While Justice Alito’s duration-sensitive approach received a
warm reception from at least three of his Supreme Court colleagues, a national sample reveals that
nearly nobody else thinks about geolocation surveillance in the way that he does.
Consistently High

Table 2: Patterns of Privacy Responses.

39.5%

Consistently Middle

11.0%

Consistently Low

16.9%

Rising Trend That Does Not Cross Midpoint

11.8%

Rising Trend That Crosses The Midpoint

5.3%

None Of These Patterns

15.5%

Proportion of participants using each of the above response patterns.
The “none of these patterns” category represents a puzzle: why would anyone not report equal
or greater privacy invasions as the duration of monitoring increased? A portion of the respondents in
that category appeared to be particularly sensitive to the use of a GPS device to determine where a
vehicle is right now, reporting a high level of privacy invasion for that item and lower scores for longer
duration monitoring. Others may have made erroneous assumptions about the level of precision
employed in the tracking – perhaps believing that long-term tracking would be necessarily less granular
161

Fully 45.4% of respondents gave only 4s or 5s (in some combination) on this question, versus 19% who gave
only 1s or 2s. This is a 2.39:1 ratio.
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than short-term tracking. Perhaps some of these respondents found our questioning confusing in other
respects or did not read the questions carefully enough. As the study was not designed to test and
differentiate between these (comparatively rare) perspectives, we cannot make any definitive
statement about what was driving these responses.
We expected to find support for the Alito view when we designed this study. A median response
pattern of 1, 2, 4, 5 would not have surprised us. That is a large part of why we designed our scales as
we did; we were expecting to show very large movements across questions. Given the pattern we
actually observed, however, one could be worried that our use of a five-point scale may have made it
easier for our subjects to respond with perfect consistency. Had we used a ten-point or one hundredpoint scale, it could be argued, participants may have been more inclined to draw distinctions between
short and long searches. As a purely methodological matter, this is correct. Participants are, in general,
more likely to draw finely-grained distinctions if they are given finely-grained scales. But two points
mitigate this concern. First, participants did have two options above the midpoint and two options
below it. Even if they felt their privacy expectations were violated in every case, they could have
responded 4, 4, 5, 5 to express that they were more violated by longer searches. Conversely they could
have responded 1, 2, 2, 2 if they felt their expectations were never violated but that they were growing
increasingly uneasy as the search lengthened. Despite these opportunities, two-thirds of participants
gave perfectly consistent responses to all four questions rather than draw any distinctions. Second,
recall that Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones would have held that short-term monitoring was not a
search whereas long-term monitoring was a search. Some of the post-Jones case law has similarly drawn
this type of binary distinction. 162 It would provide little support for these holdings if participants’
expectations were offended “90” by one-day monitoring and “95” by one-month monitoring. Even if
that difference were statistically reliable, it would not be meaningful; the monitoring would be a search
for Fourth Amendment purposes at both durations. We address this point further in a follow-up study
reported in Table 12.
Looking question by question, the level of consistency appears to be even higher than it did at
the categorical level. Recall that Table 2 requires perfect consistency across all four questions in the first
three categories. A person who responded 4, 5, 5, 5 would be counted in the “rising trend that does not
cross the midpoint category” rather than the “consistently high” category, for instance. Table 3 reports
the percentage of people giving the same response to each question from every possible question pair.
Obviously there is more consistency between neighboring questions – locate is closer to one day than to
one week and one week is closer to one month than it is to locate – but the general theme is one of
extreme consistency. The lowest level of consistency between questions is 71.6% and the average is
79.6%. In contrast, the average level of consistency among questions using the same response scale to
assess privacy expectations in other contexts was 41.9%, with the lowest pair having 24.9%
consistency. 163 So, though there are plainly people who consistently have high expectations of privacy
and consistently have low expectations of privacy, there is a surprisingly high degree of consistency on
these particular questions about surveillance duration. One could easily have, consistent with the
mosaic theory, predicted that the aggregation of search days represented by month-long tracking would
162

See supra text accompanying notes 22-49.
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Five questions using the same reasonable expectation of privacy response scale were asked on topics such as
use of facial recognition technology at sporting events and obtaining emails from an internet service provider.
These questions immediately preceded the Jones items and also included the attention check, described in note
155.
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be viewed as substantially distinct from the quantum of searching represented by a day. Despite the
vastly different levels of information that are revealed by prolonged and brief tracking, however, they
are largely viewed as the same type of search. More than 81% of respondents gave the same scores to
month and day long tracking. The expectations judgment, then, appears to be qualitative rather than
quantitative: conduct is a search, or it is not. Duration is largely irrelevant.
Table 3: Percentage of Respondents Whose Scores Are Identical Across Question Pairs

Locate

1 Day

1 Week

1 Month

77.9%

72.4%

71.6%

83.4%

81.2%

1 Day
1 Week

C.

91.2%

Explanations

After the Wave 1 data were collected and analyzed, it became clear to us that there would be a
meaningful number of consistently high and low respondents in the second wave. Respondents in Wave
2 who reported consistently low or consistently high privacy expectations were therefore asked to
report their reasoning on a subsequent page. Immediately after giving their privacy ratings, these
participants were directed to a page that noted they had given consistent responses and gave a list of
reasons that would support their doing so. They were asked to select the best one or two of the
provided answers, or to contribute their own.
To our surprise, the dominant option among those who reported consistently low expectations
of privacy is an articulation of the third party doctrine: the car’s driver is sharing the information of their
location with a number of parties and, as such, assumes the risk that it will be shared with the
government. The third party doctrine has been routinely attacked for, among other reasons, not being
consistent with everyday understanding of privacy. 164 It is therefore particularly interesting to see that
most of those who express low privacy concern actually do cite it as a driving force in their analysis. 165
See, e.g., Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 86, at 734, 740; Sonia K. McNeil, Note, Privacy and the Modern
Grid, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 199, 214-15 (2011); see also supra sources cited note 17.
164

165
Other data we collected supports the robustness of third-party doctrine beliefs among this subgroup. Majorities
of the respondents who found the third-party doctrine compelling in the OnStar example also expressed
expectations that were consistent with the doctrine when confronted with vignettes where it applied. In data that
we collected as part of this same survey for the purposes of collecting the data in Table 13, we found that those
who used the third-party doctrine to explain their consistently low expectations of privacy also had low
expectations in settings where email communications had been shared with Internet Service Providers, facial
recognition software was employed in public places, surveillance cameras were used in public parks, and historic
cell cite information was obtained from mobile phone providers. By contrast, this group of respondents had high
expectations of privacy in a vignette involving the remote activation of a webcam, when the third party doctrine
would be inapplicable. In the webcam example, 50% of third-party-doctrine adherents viewed the surveillance as
definitely a violation of reasonable expectations of privacy and 11.4% viewed it as a probable expectation of
privacy. (For all other respondents those rates were 60.8% and 12%, respectively). In every other instance, where
the third party doctrine does apply, a majority of third party adherents viewed the surveillance as not infringing a
reasonable expectation of privacy. The relevant figures were as follows: Facial recognition (3rd party group –
63.6% say not an infringement versus 48.5% of everyone else); Camera in park (3rd party – 69.3% versus 52.6%);
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Less than half as many participants cite the explanation that the authors would have predicted: that the
car is visible on public roads and could be monitored there by other means. Other plausible theories –
such as the danger inherent in driving justify the privacy invasion – did not attract high levels of support.
Table 4: Reasons Given by those with Consistently Low Privacy Expectations
(16.9% of the sample)
The driver of the car is already sharing the information from the GPS
with several companies (e.g., OnStar, the car manufacturer, the company that
owns the GPS satellites, etc.) so the driver should expect that the same
information can be shared with law enforcement.

65.19%

A car is being driven on public roads, so any police car in the vicinity
already could lawfully determine a car’s location or even follow the car for a
month.

29.63%

It is very important that the police be able to keep the population safe,
and privacy interests should give way to public safety interests.

25.19%

Only sensitive information like medical history, sexual behavior, or
political beliefs should be private and someone’s whereabouts during a
particular day or month isn’t sensitive.

20.00%

Dangerous driving is an activity that puts others’ lives at risk, and cars
are often used to commit crimes, so drivers should not expect any privacy
behind the wheel.

20.00%

Privacy is a relic of the past. In 2014, people really should not expect
privacy in any settings, especially when technology is involved.

17.04%

Other

6.67%

Numbers display the percentage of participants selecting each of the available options. Participants were
asked to select the best one or two options, but were not prevented from checking more than two
boxes. 166
Two concerns predominated among those who consistently exhibited high privacy expectations:
that the police would abuse GPS tracking if they were free to use it and that even locating a car through
GPS tracking imposes substantial restrictions on personal freedom. The first of these concerns does not
directly speak to privacy expectations and may indicate a general discomfort with granting the police the
power to invade the privacy of citizens absent process some type of process. The second echoes part of
the concern expressed by Justice Sotomayor: that monitoring of GPS information is not harmless and
may reveal a meaningful amount of personal information. 167 According to this theory, the potential for
Stingray device (3rd party – 55.7% versus 30.7%); Emails (3rd party 51.1% versus 29.6%); Historic cell site (68.2%
versus 38.8%). Note that the “everybody else” category includes those who consistently did not expect privacy in
the GPS On-Star scenario but for reasons besides the third-party doctrine.
Refined versions of these webcam, cell site, facial recognition, etc. questions were included in wave III of the
survey and those results are reported in Part III.F.
166

41% of respondents selected one explanation, 39% selected two, and 20% selected more than two.
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Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
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government observation of one’s location can create a substantial chilling effect on innocuous, or even
beneficial, behaviors. Though only a fairly small minority (21%) endorsed the argument that even a short
monitoring period could reveal as much about a person as would a long period, the endorsement of the
other item suggests that even the amount of information revealed by short term monitoring disturbed
many participants.
Roughly a third of participants who consistently found an expectation of privacy endorsed a
property-based view. These participants objected, at least in part, because the car’s own GPS system
was used to track the vehicle. This explanation comes closest to that endorsed by the Jones majority
opinion. Recall that there the Court held that GPS tracking constituted a search because the police
installed their own GPS device on the suspect’s car, thus invading the suspect’s property under Katz step
zero. 168
Table 5: Reasons Given for Consistently High Privacy Expectations (39.5% of the sample)
If the police could do this to anyone at any time they would very likely
abuse the power.

58.74%

It really restricts personal freedom for the police to be able to locate a
car whenever they feel like it, and that kind of privacy shouldn’t be
compromised.

54.55%

It is wrong for the police to use a person’s own GPS system to track
them because it is their own property.

35.31%

The police might learn just as much about a person from one day’s
monitoring as from one month’s, so they’re both equally intrusive.

21.33%

Privacy interests are very important, and public safety interests should
always give way to them.
The police could not track a car’s location using officers in squad cars
without spending lots of resources, so people don’t expect it.
Other

19.58%
9.79%
4.20%

Numbers display the percentage of participants selecting each of the available options. Participants were
encouraged to select the best one or two options, but were not limited to that.
It is also interesting to consider the explanations for both outcomes that few participants
endorsed. One theory rejected by those who regarded surveillance of any duration as problematic was
that the sheer impracticality of locating or tracking a random vehicle in a pre-GPS world – requiring a
huge investment of resources – makes the tracking unexpected. Lest this idea be dismissed as an
obvious straw man, consider Justice Sotomayor’s view that longstanding resource constraints on
government investigations continue to inform reasonable expectations of privacy, 169 Justice Alito’s
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See supra text accompanying note 22.

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[B]ecause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to
conventional surveillance techniques … it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement
practices: ‘limited police resources . . .’”).
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discussion of the “very tiny constable” needed for 18th century carriage tracking, 170 and Orin Kerr’s
equilibrium adjustment model. 171 There is something intuitively appealing in the theory that it violates
people’s privacy expectations when law enforcement acquires a seemingly magical new ability to gather
information about the activities of the citizenry. Yet less than 10% of even privacy-conscious participants
think in those terms.
Also, the idea that monitoring on public roads is always okay only attracted a third of the
privacy-unconcerned participants. This type of reasoning, suggestively endorsed by the Supreme Court
in Karo, 172 played a distinct second fiddle to the unexpected popularity of the third party doctrine. It
should be remembered, however, that the third party doctrine was only popular among those who
never felt surveillance of any duration violated a reasonable expectation of privacy. Overall, that
doctrine was endorsed by 11.6% of the sample. In contrast, 39.5% of the sample consistently rated a
GPS search as a definite violation of reasonable expectations of privacy.
Finally, the various forms of privacy absolutism attracted fairly little support. Few respondents
were willing to state that privacy was simply an obsolete concept, or that security interests should
always trump privacy interests. Similarly, not many of the respondents who rated tracking of any
duration as problematic stated that privacy should always trump security.

D.

Personality Differences

We approach the issue of Fourth Amendment law with a particular interest in the psychological
underpinnings of privacy sentiment. 173 Scholarly understandings of the psychology of privacy are in their
infancy, and the legal literature on the use of modern techniques from social psychology is extremely
sparse. 174 There has been a little bit of work considering whether people with strongly protective privacy
views are systematically different than those with comparatively unprotective views. 175 Considering the
170

Justice Scalia’s majority opinion indicates that the installation and use of a GPS tracker on a car would have
been a trespass to chattels under common law precedents applicable at the time of the Founding. 132 S. Ct. at
949. Scalia analogizes the state’s action in Jones to “a constable’s concealing himself in the target’s coach in order
to track its movements,” which would amount to trespassing. Id. at 950 n.3. Justice Alito makes his lack of
fondness for Scalia’s analogy clear. See id. at 958 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]his would have required either a
gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both – not to mention a constable with incredible fortitude and
patience.”).
See generally Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment 126 HARV. L. REV. 476
(2011).

171

172

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
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See, e.g., Kugler, supra note 130, at 1.

See, e.g., Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, When Is It Wrong to Trade Stocks on the Basis of Non-Public
Information? Public Views of the Morality of Insider Trading, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 445 (2011); Margaret C.
Stevenson & Tracy L. Caldwell, Personality in Juror Decision-Making: Toward an Idiographic Approach in Research,
33 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 93 (2009).
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See Sunil Hazari & Cheryl Brown, An Empirical Investigation of Privacy Awareness and Concerns on Social
Networking Sites, 9 J. INFO. PRIVACY & SECURITY 31, 41-45 (2013); Deborah M. Moscardelli & Richard Divine,
Adolescents’ Concern for Privacy when Using the Internet: An Empirical Analysis of Predictors and Relationships
with Privacy-Protecting Behaviors, 35 FAMILY & CONSUMER SCI. RES. J. 232, 243-47 (2007); Mike Z. Yao et al., Predicting
User Concerns about Online Privacy, 58 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 710, 718-20 (2007); Hoofnagle & Urban,
supra note 106, at 261; Kugler, supra note 130, at 1; Alan F. Westin, “Whatever Works”--The American Public's
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unanimous result in Jones, however, it could be that the privacy ideologies relevant here work
orthogonally to usual political ties. Moreover, if there are personality or other demographic factors that
explain divergences in views about privacy law, then understanding those differences might enrich a
legal realist perspective about why judges vote the way they do and how privacy may be regarded
differently in diverse communities.
Our survey instrument contained several measures that are useful for mapping the effects of
personality and political ideology on privacy attitudes. Responses to these measures were analyzed
using a between subjects analysis of variance with the response patterns described in Table 2 (with two
minor changes) as the between subjects factor. 176 The first change is that the rising trend category was
collapsed to include both trends that did and did not cross the midpoint. The second is that the “none of
these” response category was omitted as it was likely to contain a highly heterogeneous sample of
participants, including some who may have been inattentive. Thus the categories in this analysis are 1.)
consistently high, 2.) consistently middle, 3.) consistently low, and 4.) rising trend.
As mentioned in the demographics discussion, the survey included a one item measure of liberal
versus conservative orientation. As can be seen in Table 6, there were no significant differences on this
measure, though an inspection of the means suggests that those consistently low in privacy concern are
very slightly more conservative than others. It therefore does not appear that political orientations are
strongly connected to concerns about geolocation tracking.
The survey also contained a measure of authoritarian submission. The social psychological
theory of rightwing authoritarianism defines authoritarians as people who are especially willing to
submit to authority, who believe that it is particularly important to yield to traditional conventions and
norms, and who are hostile and punitive toward those who question authority or who violate such
conventions and norms. 177 The authoritarian submission scale, developed by John Duckitt and
colleagues, is intended to measure the first of those impulses: the extent to which people believe that
authority should be respected and obeyed rather than challenged and questioned. 178 Items include “It’s
great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority (reverse coded), and “What our
country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity.” The response scale
ranged from 1 – Strongly Disagree to 6 – Strongly Agree. Higher scores on the authoritarian submission
scale indicate stronger endorsement of authoritarian ideologies.

Attitudes Toward Regulation and Self-Regulation on Consumer Privacy Issues, in Privacy and Self-Regulation in the
Information Age ch.1, §F (1997), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/chapter-1-theory-markets-andprivacy.
176

An ANOVA model compares the mean scores of participants in multiple groups. The overall F statistic shows
whether or not the means of groups A, B, and C are statistically distinguishable. If there are differences between
the groups, subsequent pairwise tests can show which groups differ from each other.
See Bob Altemeyer, The Other “Authoritarian Personality,” in 30 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 4792 (M. Zanna ed. 1998).
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178
John Duckitt et al., A Tripartite Approach to Right‐Wing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism‐Conservatism‐
Traditionalism Model, 31 POL. PSYCH. 685-715 (2010). The other two authoritarianism scales developed by Duckitt
and colleagues (authoritarian aggression and traditionalism) were also administered. Given the overlap between
some of the items on those scales and the issues discussed in the survey, however, we believe that authoritarian
submission was a better measure of the ideology construct for these purposes.
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Authoritarianism is one of the two major individual difference constructs in political
psychology. 179 It has been shown to correlate with attitudes toward a wide array of political issues
including abortion, affirmative action, racial minorities in general, illegal drug use, the homeless,
homosexuality, and, among men, hostility toward women. 180 John Duckitt’s model of ideological
development describes a progression by which people who strongly value social conformity come to see
the world as a particularly dangerous place because of the many threats to that conformity. 181 This
belief in the dangerousness of the world then prompts authoritarian responses. The general model of
perceptions of threat and dangerousness leading to authoritarian-style responses has received
substantial support in the psychological literature, though some believe that the mechanism is more
nuanced. 182 Past research has also shown that authoritarianism is one of the strongest predictors of
attitudes toward both informational and decisional privacy issues. 183 This is unsurprising given the
historical links between privacy protections and autonomy beliefs. 184
As expected given the prior research on authoritarianism and privacy, responses to the
authoritarianism scale differed significantly across condition. Pairwise comparisons revealed that those
with consistently low privacy expectations had significantly higher authoritarianism scores than those in
any other category, and those with consistently high privacy expectations had significantly lower
authoritarianism scores than those in the rising trend condition. 185 The difference between the
consistently high and consistently low groups was moderate, amounting to about half a standard
deviation (Cohen’s d = .43). 186 These results are supported by prior work showing that those high in
authoritarianism are consistently less supportive of both information and decision privacy
protections. 187 In fact, the same authoritarian submission scale here has previously displayed a

See generally John Duckitt & Chris G. Sibley, A Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideological Attitudes and
System Justification, in SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF IDEOLOGY AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION 292 (2009); Altemeyer,
supra note 177, at 47.
179

Herbert L. Mirels & Janet B. Dean, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Attitude Salience, and Beliefs about Matters of
Fact, POL. PSYCH. 839, 840-41 (2006) (reviewing studies).
180

See generally John Duckitt et al., The Psychological Bases of Ideology and Prejudice: Testing A Dual Process
Model, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 75-93 (2002); Duckitt & Sibley, supra note 179, at 292.
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See David Winter, Authoritarianism – With or Without Threat?, 8 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REV. 524 (2006)
(reviewing studies); See also Stewart J.H. McCann, Societal Threat, Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and U.S. State
Death Penalty Sentencing (1977-2004), 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 913 (2008) (arguing that the directionality of
a person’s response to threat depends on their innate disposition, though authoritarian responding dominated
overall).
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Cohen’s d is a measure of effect size that is used when comparing a difference in group means. Expresses the
difference between the group means as a function of the pooled standard deviation scores of each group. In
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moderate correlation with a composite of criminal procedure privacy questions. 188 This consistency
across data collections underscores the role that authoritarianism plays in privacy attitudes.
The survey also contained a measure of the “Big 5” personality factors. These personality traits –
agreeableness, extroversion, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience – are
generally accepted to be a broad, if not totally comprehensive, measure of personality. 189 A voluminous
academic literature in psychology has identified ways in which particular personality traits are more
pronounced among people who engage in particular behaviors. For example, people who score highly
on extraversion disclose more information about themselves on social networks, 190 and highly
conscientiousness respondents are more likely to be politically conservative. 191 Extroversion has been
positively linked to social popularity and number of parties attended, agreeableness and
conscientiousness to honesty, and openness to musical inclination. 192 Interestingly, a pessimistic view of
one’s own intelligence is linked to high neuroticism even though undergraduate GPA is not. 193
The questionnaire battery we administered was specifically designed to be brief for use in masstesting environments. 194 Participants were asked to rate on a scale ranging from 1 – Strongly Disagree to
7 – Strongly Agree whether they saw themselves as, for example “extraverted, enthusiastic” and
“reserved, quiet” (both extroversion).
As can be seen in Table 6, there were significant differences across subject group on three of the
measures: conscientiousness, extroversion, and neuroticism. Post-hoc tests revealed participants in the
consistently low privacy concern group had higher mean levels of extroversion than participants in all
other categories. The effect is comparatively small, with the difference between the consistently high
and low groups being barely over .2 a standard deviation (Cohen’s d = .23) That there was a relationship
between extroversion and privacy attitudes is consistent with some prior research on the extraversion /

Id. Table 3 of that paper shows a correlation of .37 between the criminal procedure composite and
authoritarian submission. Importantly, the previous research in this area concerned privacy attitudes rather than
privacy expectations. This is the distinction between asking people how they would like the world to work and
asking them how it actually does work. We suspect this difference in question type explains why the relationship
between authoritarianism and privacy attitudes was stronger in the preceding paper.
188
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See generally COSTA, P. T., JR., & MCCRAE, R. R., REVISED NEO PERSONALITY INVENTORY (NEO-PI-R) AND NEO FIVE- FACTOR
INVENTORY (NEO-FFI) PROFESSIONAL MANUAL (1992); John, O. P., & Srivastava, S., The Big Five Trait Taxonomy: History,
Measurement, and Theoretical Perspectives, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 102-138 (L.A. Pervin &
O.P. John eds. 1999); Murray R. Barrick & Michael K. Mount, The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job
Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 44 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1, 1–5 (1991).
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Facebook? An Investigation into the Relationship Between the Big Five, Shyness, Narcissism, Loneliness, and
Facebook Usage, 27 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 1658, 1662 (2011).
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privacy nexus, however. 195 This relationship may suggest that, although those who didn’t expect
geolocation privacy are few in number, they are much more likely to have their views felt in social and
political settings because extraverts advertise their views far more than do introverts. Observers may
therefore assume that anti-privacy sentiment is more common than it actually is. This dynamic
illustrates the dangers that might arise if judges assess popular expectations of privacy by talking only to
their peers and assume that peer sentiment reflects popular sentiment; those who remain silent may be
systematically different from those who speak up.
Table 6: Personality Characteristics as a Function of Privacy Views
F (3,1229)

2

η

Consistently
High

Consistently
Low

Consistently
Middle

Rising Trend

B5 - Agreeable

0.34

.001 5.17

(1.23) 5.15

(1.30) 5.11

(1.15) 5.23

(1.20)

B5 - Neuroticism

2.62 *

.006 3.00ab

(1.36) 2.87b

(1.39) 3.22a

(1.31) 3.12a

(1.43)

B5 - Conscientious

4.62 **

.011 5.72bc

(1.16) 5.95a

(1.09) 5.52c

(1.23) 5.74b

(1.13)

B5 - Openness

2.38

.006 5.00

(1.23) 4.86

(1.18) 4.73

(1.18) 4.95

(1.21)

B5 - Extroversion

3.26 *

.008 3.60b

(1.47) 3.93a

(1.43) 3.65b

(1.22) 3.63b

(1.50)

LiberalismConservatism

1.23

.003 3.95

(1.70) 4.18

(1.75) 4.08

(1.51) 3.99

(1.63)

.028 3.50c

(1.04) 3.94a

(0.98) 3.60bc

(0.73) 3.67b

(0.92)

(1.12) 3.15

(1.12) 3.14

(1.02) 3.24

(1.02)

(16.59) 54.00a

(16.21) 48.97b

(16.44) 49.62b

(16.36)

(.33) .53

(.33) .48

(.32) .52

Authoritarianism

11.95 ***

Educational
attainment

0.64

.001 3.15

Age

8.84 ***

.021 47.58b

Supreme Court
Knowledge

0.87

.002 .51

*** p < .001; ** p< .01; * p < .05
Group means are significantly different when they do not share subscripts. So for authoritarianism, the
consistently high group (c) is significantly different than the low group (a) but not the middle group (bc).
Subjects in the low privacy concern group also reported significantly higher levels of
conscientiousness than those in the other groups. The difference between the low concern group and
the middle group was moderate (Cohen’s d = .37), but the difference between the low and high groups
was fairly small (Cohen’s d = .20). Additionally, those in the rising trend privacy concern group reported
higher levels of conscientiousness than those in the middle group though, again, this effect was fairly
small (Cohen’s d = .17). There were no other significant differences on conscientiousness.
Subjects with low privacy concern reported lower levels of neuroticism than participants in the
middle privacy concern (Cohen’s d = .26) or rising trend categories (Cohen’s d = .18), but these were
small and there were no significant differences between any groups and the high privacy concern
category.
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(.33)

The survey included a measure of Supreme Court knowledge that consisted of four factual
questions about the Supreme Court of varying difficulty. These asked participants to identify the current
Chief Justice, report the number of Justices on the Court and the number that are female, and identify
which of four Justices voted to uphold the individual mandate portion of the Affordable Care Act. 196 The
result was a proportion score ranging from 0 to 1 indicating the percent of questions correct. This
measure interestingly did not vary across condition. We had imagined that, given the third party
doctrine and the Jones decision, either the rising trend or consistently low categories would attract
disproportionate numbers of informed participants. But this does not appear to have been the case.
Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, neither race nor gender was significantly related to privacy expectations
in our survey.
Analyses were also conducted on the demographic measures of age and educational
attainment. Though there was no effect of privacy group on educational attainment, those in the low
privacy concern group were significantly older on average than people in the other three groups. This
was a moderate effect, with the difference between the consistently high and consistently low group
means amounting to 6.42 years (Cohen’s d = .39). This finding cuts strongly against the conventional
wisdom that younger cohorts do not care about their privacy. 197 At least when it comes to geolocation
tracking, younger voters seem more inclined to view surveillance of any duration as constitutionally
problematic. Older voters were more likely to cite the third party doctrine as the basis for their belief
that sharing information with a third party entails an assumption that it can be shared with the
government. By contrast, younger voters may have been acculturated during an area when sharing
information with some acquaintances did not necessitate sharing it broadly.
Our surprising finding relating to age has important implications for judicial behavior. Judges
tend to be much older than the population at large. Notably, those who endorse the third party doctrine
are old even when compared to the others in the consistently low privacy concern group. 198 Those who
endorse the third party doctrine were, on average, 58.45 years old (SD = 15.62). Those in the low privacy
196

The options for the Chief Justice question were Antonin Scalia, John Roberts, William Rehnquist, and Elena
Kagan. The options for the Affordable Care Act question were Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Roberts, and
Anthony Kennedy. The other two questions had fill-in-the-blank style response options. Correct responses to our
survey were similar to those of a recent poll by the Pew Research Center, which included some of the same
questions but permitted respondents to refuse to answer the questions, which many did. See Meredith Dost, Dim
Public Awareness of Supreme Court as Major Public Rulings Loom, Pew Research Center, May 14, 2015, available
at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/14/dim-public-awareness-of-supreme-court-as-major-rulingsloom/ (visited July 10, 2015).
See, e.g., Jo Bryce & Mathias Klang, Young People, Disclosure of Personal Information and Online Privacy:
Control, Choice, and Consequences, 14 INFO. SEC. TECHNICAL REP. 160, 160 (2009) (“It has been claimed that users,
particularly young people, have a lack of interest in their online privacy because of disinterest, insufficient
awareness of the complexities of technology and data mining practices, and / or lack of understanding of legal
protections.”); Kashmir Hill, Zuckerberg's Right: Young People Don't Care (as Much) About Privacy, FORBES (Jan. 10,
2010), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2010/01/10/zuckerbergs-right-young-people-dontcare-as-much-about-privacy/.; But cf. Moscardelli & Divine, supra note 175, at 246 (finding teens had higher levels
of privacy vigilance than adults, as reflected on temporally distant survey responses); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, How
Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When It Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies?, at 20
(April 14, 2010 draft) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864 (finding younger
respondents and older respondents largely in alignment with respect to privacy attitudes and concerns).
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group adopting other explanations were, on average, 50.57 (SD = 16.02). This is a moderate effect
(Cohen’s d = .52), and is coming on top of an already moderate age difference between the low privacy
concern group and the remainder of the sample. The disproportionate appeal of the third-party doctrine
to older Americans could help explain its staying power despite its apparent lack of resonance with
younger Americans. Interestingly, there was no parallel difference on authoritarianism or Supreme
Court knowledge. 199

E.

Question Wording and the Robustness of Expectations

Any single formulation of a question is inherently limited and subject to criticism. Had we asked
about whether it violates a person’s “privacy” for law enforcement to engage in tracking, we could have
been fairly criticized for not asking the right question: is the doctrine not clear that we are concerned
with “reasonable expectations” of privacy? But having asked about reasonable expectations of privacy,
we can be fairly criticized for asking ordinary Americans to give a legal conclusion rather than a factual
impression; how are people to know whether their expectations of privacy are “reasonable?” Rather
than engage in a long debate over the best question wording, we decided to test whether wording
matters. A study was conducted using a convenience sample of 1144 American adults recruited from
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. 200 This sample was not census-representative. It was, for example,
58.1% male and had a median age of 29. Its baselines therefore should not be taken to represent the
views of any definable population or subpopulation. But the purpose of the study was to test whether
differences in question wording led to differences in response patterns. Answering this question only
requires random assignment to condition, not random sampling of a population.
Six different question variants were tested, comprising a 3 (expectations) x 2 (first or third
person) design. The expectations factor varied whether the question asked about “reasonable
expectations of privacy,” “expectations of privacy,” or, simply, “privacy.” The first or third person factor
varied whether participants were asked if the law enforcement action would violate “your” privacy or
whether it would violate “people’s” privacy. The questions were otherwise as used in the preceding
study. 201 Our prediction was that the expectations manipulation would have no significant effect on
participant responses. Based on prior research by Slobogin and Schumacher, 202 however, we expected
that participants would report greater privacy expectations for the first person framing than the third
person framing. The main question there was whether the first- versus third-person framing would
interact with either the expectations manipulation or the search duration effect beyond merely
elevating the degree of privacy expectation.
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The median age was 29 (range 18-77, M = 32.14, SD = 10.36). 10.8% had graduate degrees, 40.6% had four year
college degrees, 19.6% had two year degrees, 28.7% had high school degrees, and .3% had not completed high
school. The sample was also substantially less conservative (M = 3.20, SD = 1.53) and less authoritarian (M = 3.03,
SD = 1.05) than were the respondents in waves 1 and 2. The sample originally contained 1205 respondents, but
data from 61 were discarded because the participants failed an attention check.
201

The one exception was a rewording of the locate question. The revised version read “Used a car's onboard GPS
system to locate it on public streets at a single moment in time without the owner's permission?” This was
different than the version in waves 1 and 2, which read “Used a car’s onboard GPS system to locate it on public
streets without the owner’s permission?” We believe the revised version is slightly clearer. This study actually
included both versions and the results for each did not differ.
202

Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 86, at 759.
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Table 7: Mean Responses and Variations of Privacy Wording
3rd Person
1st Person
Total
Privacy
4.41 (.89) 4.61 (.73) 4.51 (.82)
Expectation of Privacy
4.29 (.98) 4.50 (.89) 4.40 (.94)
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
4.23 (1.11) 4.48 (.98) 4.35 (1.05)
Total
4.31 (1.00) 4.53 (.87) 4.42 (.94)
A univariate ANOVA conducted on the mean privacy expectation scores (averaging the locate,
one day, one week, and one month) responses revealed no significant effect of the expectations factor;
it did not matter which version of the question was asked. 203 The first vs. third person factor had the
predicted effect, with more privacy violation reported for the first person wording. 204 There was no
interaction between the two manipulations, however, and a mixed ANOVA using the four durations as a
within-subjects factor and the two conditions as between-subjects factors revealed only the expected
effect of duration. 205 There were no significant interactions between duration and the two experimental
manipulations.
The analysis of the means therefore shows only one meaningful effect: more privacy (or
expectations of privacy, or reasonable expectations of privacy) is being violated when participants are
thinking of searches of themselves than when they are thinking of searches of other people. This effect
is not particularly large, but it is statistically significant. There are not, however, any interactions
between the experimental manipulations and duration. There is not, for example, any greater difference
between one day tracking and one month tracking when participants are thinking of themselves, or
answering the expectations version of the question.
Using the consistency categories that we employed for waves 1 and 2 shows similar results.
There are no significant differences across the expectation conditions. 206 There is a significant effect
across first versus third person, however, such that there are more people in the consistently high
category when the first person wording is used. 207 This is consistent with a general increase in privacy
expectations in the first person conditions.

F(2, 1138) = 2.88, p = .06 η2 = .005. This could be seen as a nonsignificant trend, but it is best disregarded given
the large sample size (N = 1140) and small effect size. By comparison, the effect size of the duration changes was
approximately 20 times as large.

203

204

F(2, 1138) = 15.93, p < .001 η2 = .014.

F(1.74, 1977.26) = 143.51, p < .001 η2 = .11. Due to a sphericity violation, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction is
reported here. Pairwise comparisons indicated that all durations were significantly different from each other
(Locate = 4.19; Day = 4.43, Week = 4.52; Month = 4.55).
205

206

Overall χ 2 (10, 1144) = 12.735, p =.24.

Overall χ 2 (5, 1144) = 22.19, p < .001. A chi square analysis contrasting the prevalence of consistently high
responses in each group showed that difference was also significant. χ 2 (1, 1144) = 19.76, p < .001.
207
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Table 8: Consistency Categories as a Function of Experimental Conditions 208
Privacy
4.4%

Expectations
8.8%

Reasonable
Expectations
9.6%

3rd
Person
9.9%

1st
Person
5.4%

Consistently Low

3.1%

4.4%

5.1%

4.8%

3.6%

Consistently Middle

2.1%

1.6%

1.3%

1.9%

1.4%

Consistently High

62.5%

56.9%

58.1%

52.7%

65.6%

Rising Trend

24.2%

23.4%

21.6%

25.6%

20.6%

3.6%

4.9%

4.3%

5.1%

3.5%

None of these

Rising Trend that Crosses

Overall, then, these data suggest that the choice of a “reasonable expectations of privacy”
wording was not decisive in producing the reported results. Had we employed an “expectations of
privacy” or merely “privacy” wording we likely would have shown the same pattern. Also, even as
radical a change as use of a first person framing only changes the baseline level of responses; it does not
interact with the duration levels to suppress or exacerbate duration differences. Our results are
therefore relatively robust to wording choices.
Further, we should note a vast difference between the baseline responses observed in our
Mechanical Turk sample, which skews young and male, and our census-representative sample. Though
Mechanical Turk is a convenient mechanism for data collection, these data suggest that it should not be
used to establish base rates in the privacy domain; the demographic differences are simply too
important. We would have suspected this based on the age effect observed in our representative
sample, but these data confirm our concerns in a striking fashion.

F. Wave 3: Replication, Intrusiveness, and Suggestive Data on Other Searches.
Waves 1 and 2 left open three obvious areas for further exploration. One of these is simple
replication. Are the privacy expectations measured here stable over time, or would results gathered
mere weeks or months later differ? We know from the wave 1-wave 2 comparison that differences of a
few weeks are likely not relevant – those waves were indistinguishable even though the Reilly decision
was handed down in the interim. But what about the space of a year?
Another area of expansion relates our expectation data to the intrusiveness data collected by
Slobogin in his various studies. We have shown that expectations vary little as search duration increases.
Is the same also true of the perceived intrusiveness of a search? If not, this may implicate the post-Katz
reasonableness analysis as well as Kerr’s policy model.

208

Compare the responses reported in Tables 1 and 2 (nationally representative sample) to the much more privacy
protective responses reported in Tables 7 and 8 (Mechanical Turk sample). The nationally representative sample
gave mean expectation ratings for locate, one day, one week, and one month searches of 3.41, 3.53, 3.57, and 3.61
respectively. The same numbers for the identically worded question (3rd person, reasonable expectations) from the
Mechanical Turk collection were 4.02, 4.22, 4.32, and 4.35 respectively, an average difference of .70 on a five point
scale. To give some sense of magnitude, .70 is also roughly the difference in expectation ratings we observe
between examining the content of a person’s emails and inspecting a hotel guest registry (see Table 13). Similarly,
the proportion of people with consistently high responses goes from 39.50% to 49.20%, while the proportion with
consistently low responses goes from 16.90% to 5.88%.
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Finally, it is worth calibrating our expectations data in the GPS monitoring context by comparing
it to data from other, related contexts. What do privacy expectations look like in the domain of cell site
monitoring? Or use of facial recognition technology?
In part to answer these questions, a third wave of data collection was conducted between May
26 and June 2, 2015, approximately a year after waves one and two. Participants for this wave were also
recruited by Toluna. The final sample contained 1441 respondents, all of whom were adult US
Citizens. 209 The median age was 46 (range 18-89, M = 46.04, SD = 16.41). 49.8% of the sample was
female. Slightly more of the sample than the national population as a whole had completed at least
some college coursework, but otherwise the educational attainment of the sample was roughly
equivalent to that of the broader population. 210 79.7% of the sample identified as White, 13.1% as Black,
and 4.2% as South or East Asian. On a separate question, 17.1% reported identifying as Hispanic or
Latino. When asked to rate their political orientation on a scale ranging from 1 – Very Liberal to 7 – Very
Conservative, the mean response was 4.19 (SD = 1.78), indicating a politically moderate sample.
Participants in this study received one of four versions of the GPS tracking question. One version
mirrored that used in waves 1 and 2 in that it asked about reasonable expectations of privacy and
provided participants with a 5 point response scale. The only difference between the questions of waves
1 and 2 and those of the new wave is that the new wave’s employed a slightly revised version of the
locate question. It now read “Used a car’s onboard GPS system to locate it on public streets without the
owner’s permission?” We believe that this is somewhat clearer than the earlier version. 211
As can be seen in Table 9, the results of each wave are nearly identical. There are no significant
differences in the means or the consistency categories.

209

The survey instrument contained a question directing participants to show that they were paying attention by
selecting a particular answer choice. Only participants who responded correctly to this question were included in
the analysis.
210

In the sample, 12.1% had graduate degrees, 28.2% had four year college degrees, 23.1% had two year degrees,
34.5% had high school degrees, and 2% had not completed high school.
211

As mentioned above in note 201, both versions were used in the wording test study and the results did not
differ.
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Table 9: Consistency Between 2014 and 2015 Waves.
Waves I and II Wave III
Consistently High

39.5%

37.8%

Consistently Middle

11.0%

11.0%

Consistently Low

16.9%

15.2%

Rising Trend/Not Cross

11.8%

13.5%

Rising Trend/Cross

5.3%

6.4%

None Of These Patterns

15.5%

16.0%

Waves I and II
Mean

% Below

Wave III

% Above

Mean

% Below

% Above

Locate
3.41 (1.51)
28%
51%
3.44 (1.50)
27%
54%
Track 1 Day
3.53 (1.51)
25%
56%
3.55 (1.52)
24%
57%
Track 1 Week 3.57 (1.51)
25%
58%
3.67 (1.46)
21%
61%
Track 1 Month 3.61 (1.51)
24%
59%
3.73 (1.46)
19%
63%
This data should therefore help to alleviate concerns that privacy attitudes will not be consistent
over time. Even after a year, a year that included any number of events arguably relevant to policecommunity relations, 212 almost nothing has changed.
The second version of the GPS tracking question asked three questions designed to assess the
intrusiveness of GPS tracking rather than expectations. The wording of these is as below:
•

•
•
•

If law enforcement used a car's onboard GPS system to locate it on public streets at a single
moment in time without the owner's permission:
o How intrusive would this be?
o How likely would this be to reveal sensitive personal information?
o How embarrassing would this be?
If law enforcement used a car's onboard GPS system to track its movements on public streets for
one day without the owner's permission.
o Questions repeat.
Same, but for one week.
Same, but for one month.

The intrusiveness question mirrors that used by Slobogin in his research. The separate questions
involving the revelation of personal information and embarrassment are intended to be supplemental
measures of the social cost of allowing a search. They are drawn from Kugler’s prior work on searches of
electronic devices. 213 All response scales ranged from 1 – Not at All to 5 – Very, with no labels on the
See, for example, Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged With the Murder of
Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 2015, at A1.
212

See Kugler, supra note 86, at 1194 (using these as measures of the privacy and dignity interests implicated by
border searches of electronic devices).
213
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other points. Note that the midpoint is less inherently meaningful for these three questions. Whereas a
below-midpoint answer to the expectation question can fairly be read as “not violating expectations,” a
below-midpoint response to the embarrassment item may be fairly read as “only somewhat
embarrassing.” Whether “only somewhat embarrassing” is embarrassing enough to be of legal
significance is, of course, a policy question.
These data followed a somewhat different pattern. As can be seen in Table 10, there are larger
shifts on these measures as the search duration lengthens. Though the expectation score increases by
only .29 as the search lengthens from locate to 1 month, the intrusiveness score increases by .57, the
sensitive information score by .61, and the embarrassment score by .45. 214
Table 10: Mean Intrusiveness, Information, and Embarrassment Scores For Each Duration of Search
Mean
Intrusiveness

Reveal
Sensitive
Information

Locate
Track 1 Day
Track 1 Week

3.59
3.95
4.07

(1.38)
(1.28)
(1.26)

% Below
22%
15%
12%

Track 1 Month
Locate
Track 1 Day
Track 1 Week
Track 1 Month

4.16
3.37
3.66
3.86
3.98

(1.23)
(1.33)
(1.22)
(1.21)
(1.20)

12%
25%
17%
13%
12%

76%
47%
56%
63%
70%

3.34

(1.36)

25%

45%

3.51
3.66
3.79

(1.30)
(1.30)
(1.32)

20%
18%
16%

50%
55%
60%

Embarrassment Locate
Track 1 Day
Track 1 Week
Track 1 Month

% Above
56%
69%
72%

As can be seen in Table 11, this increased salience for duration had some effect on the
consistency categories. There were consistently more people in one of the rising trend categories for the
intrusiveness (31.7%), information (35.6%), and embarrassment (30.4%) measures than for the
expectations measure (19.9%). 215

214

This difference is reflected in the effect sizes for each measure. ANOVAs examining the effect of duration on
expectations showed an effect size of only .048. F(2.12, 765.77) = 18.02, p < .001 η2 = .048. The effect sizes for
intrusion (.127), information (.127), and embarrassment (.090) were much higher. F(2.14, 802.27) = 54.60, p < .001
η2 = .127; F(1.92, 719.21) = 54.48, p < .001 η2 = .127; and F(2.18, 815.45) = 36.98, p < .001 η2 = .090, respectively.
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections used for all degrees of freedom.
Intrusiveness: χ 2 (1, 747) = 13.51, p < .001. Information: χ 2 (1,747) = 22.81, p < .001. Embarrassment: χ 2 (1, 747)
= 10.88, p < .001.
215
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Table 11: Consistency Categories for Expectations, Intrusiveness, Information, and Embarrassment
Reveal
Sensitive
Information Embarrassment
19.50%
19.70%
6.80%
10.60%
10.60%
14.30%

Expectations
16.0%
15.2%
11.0%

Intrusiveness
16.1%
8.8%
6.5%

Consistently High

37.8%

36.9%

27.50%

24.90%

Rising Trend/Not Cross

13.5%

22.6%

23.40%

24.90%

6.4%

9.1%

12.20%

5.50%

None of these
Consistently Low
Consistently Middle

Rising Trend/Cross

The final two versions of the GPS tracking questions presented the same expectations or
intrusion questions as the preceding two but gave response scales that ranged from 0 to 100. These
scales were presented in the form of sliders that presented a numerical value in the margin, allowing
determined participants to choose exact figures. These conditions were included for two reasons. First,
Slobogin’s work has all been conducted using a 101-point intrusion scale. Using a similar scale for our
intrusion measure permits us to see how the level of GPS intrusion we observe compares to his results
for other searches. Second, this allows us to test an extreme of question formatting. Our use of a 5 point
scales to this point was somewhat arbitrary – one could defensibly have chosen to use a 2 point scale
(yes, no), a four point scale (lacking a midpoint), and an N point scale (allowing finer gradations). A 101
point scale allows participants to draw as distinctions as finely as they could wish.
Table 12: Means for 101 Point Scales
Expectations
Locate
Track 1 Day
Track 1 Week
Track 1 Month

Intrusiveness

Reveal Sensitive
Information

Embarrassment

60.18

(35.74)

61.79

(32.19)

59.57

(31.03)

55.91

(33.54)

64.85

(35.33)

71.35

(30.41)

66.29

(28.84)

60.47

(32.96)

67.42

(35.39)

75.38

(29.37)

71.62

(28.73)

64.61

(32.18)

69.63

(35.20)

79.53

(28.36)

76.77

(26.78)

68.96

(31.56)

Table 12 contains the data from these 101 point scales. There are several takeaways. First, on
expectations respondents do not sharply differentiate between searches of varying duration even given
the ability to draw very finely-grained distinctions. The difference between a locate search and one
month of tracking is less than 10 points. Second, on both expectations and intrusiveness, there is
virtually no daylight between tracking for one week and tracking for one month. On expectations, a
mere 2 points out of 101 separate these two searches. On intrusiveness, a mere 4 points. Statistically,
these scores differ. 216 As a practical matter, however, doctrine would need to slide a knife’s edge
between them in order to treat them as distinct. This presents a challenge for courts attempting to

All differences on all measures are significant at the p < .01 level. This is unsurprising given that each cell has
over 350 participants and the comparison is within-subjects.
216
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implement the mosaic theory’s duration distinction because many of them have attempted to draw a
line in precisely this place.
The intrusiveness, information, and embarrassment scores do support distinguishing searches of
a moment from searches of a month, however. Under our theory, consideration of this distinction
should occur after the Katz prong 1 determination that the Fourth Amendment is potentially implicated.
They would be germane to the “private facts” analysis that unfolds as part of Katz prong 2.
Approximately half the sample, 739 respondents, were asked to rate a series of other law
enforcement activities on the same five point expectations of privacy scale used for the GPS tracking
questions in the waves 1 and 2 and given to some participants in wave 3. Though these results are not
central to our project, they provide a sense of how the rule we advocate in the GPS monitoring context
would affect the handling of other hot-button Fourth Amendment questions.
Table 13: Results for Other Searches
% Above
73%
63%
51%
49%
38%
33%
29%

Mean
217

Remote Activate Webcam
Obtain Emails From ISP
Stingray Cellphone Tracking
Cell Site Data
Inspect Hotel Guest Registry
Facial Recognition At Super Bowl
Camera In Public Park

4.06
3.73
3.42
3.26
2.99
2.61
2.40

(1.37)
(1.40)
(1.42)
(1.50)
(1.51)
(1.54)
(1.55)

% Below
15%
20%
25%
31%
38%
52%
58%

Ratio:
Above/Below
4.74
3.16
2.03
1.57
1.00
0.63
0.49

Our subjects differentiated sharply among these other types of law enforcement surveillance.
On some of these, the public was quite divided. Popular expectations regarding inspection of hotel guest
registries, a topic visited by the Court in the 2015 case City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 218 were exactly evenly
split with as many people expecting privacy as not. On tracking a person using cell site data, on the other
217
The exact wording of each scenario is below. They appeared in random order. Participants were asked if it
would violate people’s reasonable expectations of privacy if law enforcement:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
218

Used remote activation software to turn on the webcam on their laptop without their permission?
Obtained from their Internet Service Provider copies of emails exchanged between them and someone
else?
Used a fake cell tower to trick their phone into giving the police more accurate information about where
the phone is?
Obtained from their cell phone company stored information about whether their cell phone was near a
particular location on a particular day?
Searched a hotel’s guest register to obtain the names, home addresses, and assigned hotel room numbers
of the guests who stayed there on a particular night?
Used facial recognition software to check whether any of the fans entering the Super Bowl stadium match
images in a Department of Homeland Security database?
Installed a video camera to watch a public park where criminal activity has recently occurred?

135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015).
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hand, about half the participants thought this was a violation of their expectations of privacy, and just
under a third disagreed. This is a lopsided split, but reasonable people can disagree about whether it is
lopsided enough to raise concern.
There were other instances, however, in which a very clear majority of the public either had or
lacked expectations of privacy. A supermajority believes that the police’s remote activation of the
webcam on a person’s personal computer would violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. It is,
surprisingly, not well-established in the case law whether such tactics amount to Fourth Amendment
searches or violations of federal law when engaged in by law enforcement. 219 An overwhelming majority
also feels that the police obtaining emails from an Internet Service Provider infringed a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Federal law generally requires police to obtain a warrant to access recent email
communications, 220 and one circuit court has ruled that the Fourth Amendment also requires the police
to obtain a warrant in order to obtain any emails from an Internet Service Provider. 221 By contrast, most
survey respondents were comfortable with police tactics like the installation of a video surveillance
camera in a public park where criminal activity had recently occurred. Those who believed such tactics
definitely did not or probably did not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy outnumbered those
who had opposite feelings by a 58% to 29% margin. The case law is consistent with popular sentiment
here as well. 222

IV.

Conclusion

This project has both empirical and doctrinal implications. As an empirical matter, we show that
very large majorities of the American public do not conceptualize Fourth Amendment expectations of
privacy in a manner that is congenial to the “mosaic theory.” Americans generally regard the police’s use
of car-based GPS devices to determine an individual’s whereabouts as the sort of action that infringes
on a reasonable expectation of privacy regardless of whether geolocation information is collected for a
long or short period of time. These Americans mostly cite the potential for police abuse and
infringements on personal freedom as the basis for their consistent privacy concern. A substantial
minority of the population regards the use of such devices as unproblematic from a Fourth Amendment
perspective and, again, the duration of surveillance does not appear to make much difference. Among
members of this subgroup, the much-maligned third-party-doctrine finds substantial numbers of
adherents. Only a tiny percentage of respondents have differential responses based on the length of
surveillance, and even among these respondents the “longer surveillance is more problematic” view is
hardly universal. It is fair to say, then, that the people whose expectations of privacy are purportedly at
issue when the Court considers the Fourth Amendment’s scope are duration-insensitive with regard to
geolocation surveillance.
Attitudes toward privacy and expectations of privacy are heterogeneous across the population,
and this heterogeneity is predictable. Political psychology metrics like Duckitt’s authoritarian-submission
219

See Clements-Jeffrey v. City of Springfield, 810 F. Supp.2d 857, 865-66, 874-77 (S.D. Ohio 2011).

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (Stored Communications Act warrant requirement); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Wiretap Act
super warrant requirement). The government may obtain emails that have been in electronic storage for longer
than 180 days via subpoena, provided it gives advance notice to the email user. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)
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See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in
email contents).

221

222

See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 911 F. Supp.2d 836, 842-43 (D. Ariz. 2012).
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personality scale correlate with expectations of information privacy in police search contexts. Other
psychological orientations, like the Big Five extraversion scale, are also useful in predicting individuals’
responses to real-world investigation scenarios. Still other demographic variables, like age, plausibly
drive the resonance of some doctrines, the third-party-doctrine in particular. This paper is an important
first step toward the broader goal of explaining the psychological basis privacy expectations.
On the doctrinal front, our project offers a cleaner way for courts to resolve Fourth Amendment
questions. Fourth Amendment doctrine has become an unpredictable jumble. We think that the science
of survey research has now advanced to the point where analytical clarity is achievable in a manner that
takes the idea of “reasonable expectations of privacy” seriously. It is not Justice Alito’s fault, nor the
fault of other justices, that their sense of what people expect is occasionally out of line with what people
actually expect 223 – the academy has failed to provide jurists with sufficiently trustworthy data about the
public’s perceptions. The price of gathering and analyzing survey results from a representative sample of
Americans is declining toward zero, and this dropping price-point makes it increasingly feasible for social
scientists in the academy to gather such data for the benefit of courts and police departments. We
argue that such data can and should be one critical tool for resolving questions under the Katz Court’s
reasonable expectation of privacy test.
Having covered our empirical and doctrinal contributions, it is worth raising a normative
question about whether it matters that the public and the Supreme Court justices are in this instance
out of step in their assessments when it comes to privacy expectations. Does the fact that the mosaic
theory fails to resonate with the public render the theory bad law? We believe that is a difficult
question, but we are inclined to answer “yes.” We were initially persuaded by the sentiment voiced by
jurists like Judge Ginsburg and Justice Alito that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts when it
comes to information privacy. But this idea’s failure to resonate with the public presents a problem. The
Fourth Amendment exists for instrumental purposes – it allows people to predict when an action will
remain private and when it may become public, and to direct their behavior accordingly. It is a problem
when Fourth Amendment protections and popular expectations are misaligned because people are then
guarded when they should feel free and feel free when they should be guarded. Liberty is senselessly
diminished and people needlessly self-censor when they underestimate legal protections for privacy.
Privacy is needlessly invaded and people take inadequate precautions when they overestimate the law’s
protection for privacy. The mosaic theory’s most prominent academic critic has emphasized how
difficult it would be for courts to operationalize its implications as Fourth Amendment doctrine. 224 Our
research identifies an even more troubling concern – the private citizens whose behavior is to be
influenced by the Fourth Amendment largely regard the mosaic theory as non-intuitive and perhaps
even unintelligible.
One possible reaction to this problem is to conclude that advocates of the mosaic theory have a
great deal of marketing and persuasion work ahead of them. If the doctrine is sound as a policy matter,
perhaps the solution to our dilemma is to correct the expectations of ordinary Americans. Our other
ongoing research makes us inclined to believe that at least in the short run such persuasion efforts

See supra note 53; cf. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view, the only
thing the past three decades have established about the Katz test … is that, unsurprisingly, those actual subjective
expectations of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable bear an uncanny resemblance to those
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
223

224

Kerr, supra note 6, at 328-343, 346-348.
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would be largely futile. While a sufficiently determined campaign might make strides over time, we are
skeptical.
Another possible reaction is to declare that reasonable expectations of privacy for Fourth
Amendment purposes have nothing to do with what reasonable Americans expect. We also find this
possibility unappealing. The practical costs of disagreement are very real, and the harm to legitimacy is
also likely real, if difficult to quantify. Absent an anchor to the opinions of ordinary Americans, the
content of the Fourth Amendment becomes subject to the whims of unrepresentative legal elites. Given
that our data show that basic personality and demographic factors, including age, strongly influence
privacy expectations, it is inevitable that elite and popular opinion will diverge on these issues. At a time
when the Court is famously homogeneous in so many respects, 225 we should not be comfortable if
judges and justices rely entirely on the limits of their personal experiences. Modern social science has
developed to the point where the legal system need not and should not tolerate “this is what I expect”
or “this is what my law clerk expects” being used as a proxy for what members of society generally
expect and value. If the courts are to ignore actual laypeople’s expectations of privacy as a factor
relevant to the Katz inquiry, then the “reasonable expectations of privacy” test deserves a candid
renaming, and the largely inattentive American public deserves an explanation for why their
expectations are not deemed relevant.
Rather than adopt either of these answers, we have proposed what we think is a more sensible,
data-driven approach to the morass that is Fourth Amendment search doctrine. Under our method,
popular expectations assessed via rigorous social science techniques would become a key part of the
Fourth Amendment inquiry, displacing the courts’ presently inconsistent approach to Katz prong 1. An
exploration of these expectations would not be the only relevant consideration – courts would still
explore existing precedents and common law limitations as part of Katz step zero, and they will still
examine the sensitivity of the information at issue in Katz prong 2. In short, we propose a system
whereby courts do in a regular and organized manner what they currently do ad hoc, and where they
use empirical social science to do much better what was previously left to bare intuition.
The mosaic theory emerged from the minds of judges who wanted to guarantee some measure
of Fourth Amendment privacy in the digital age without overruling Knotts, which held short-term
geolocation surveillance to be a non-search. We are personally sympathetic to the goals of the mosaic
theory. Given how the Fourth Amendment precedents of the 1980s and 1990s interact with the realities
of cheap electronic monitoring, some doctrinal innovation is needed to leave space for personal privacy.
But the mosaic theory fails miserably as a descriptive account of what people expect from law
enforcement. We are concerned enough by this disconnect to become skeptical about whether the
revolution in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that United States v. Jones seems to foreshadow will
prove to be an enduring endeavor. Given these data, rejecting Knotts is better than trying to translate
the mosaic theory into workable and intuitive doctrine. Returning to the central issue emerging from
Jones, then, we think it makes sense to stand with the very large group of citizens who label geolocation
surveillance of any length an infringement of reasonable privacy expectations rather than with the very
tiny group who say that the Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the surveillance lasts long enough.

See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, The 2014 Supreme Court: An Ivy League Clan, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 13, 2014), available
at http:// www.newrepublic.com/article/120173/2014-supreme-court-ivy-league-clan-disconnected-reality
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